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ABSTRACT
If there was any time to expect a large peace-time multiplier effect from federal spending in the states,
it would have been during the period from 1930 through 1940.  Interest rates were near the zero bound,
and unemployment rates never fell below 10 percent and there was ample idle capacity.   We develop
an annual panel data set for the 48 states from 1930 through 1940 with evidence on federal government
grants, loans, and tax collections and a variety of measures of economic activity.  Using panel data
methods we estimate a multiplier, defined as the change in per capita state economic activity in response
to an additional dollar per capita of federal funds.  The state per capita personal income multiplier
with respect to per capita federal grants was around 1.1.  Some point estimates for multipliers for nontransfer
grants and nonfarm grants were higher but not statistically significantly different from one.  There
is some evidence that AAA farm grants had negative or no effect on personal income.  Federal grants
had stronger effects on consumption than on personal income, but they had no positive effect on various
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In Search of the Multiplier for Federal Spending in the States  
During the Great Depression  
The Great Recession of 2007 to 2009 has been described as the worst downturn 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s.  In both periods the federal government sought 
to combat the downturns with sharp increases in federal spending.  The recent federal 
stimulus package has led to a surge of interest in fiscal policy multipliers.  The current 
environment for fiscal multipliers is similar to the Great Depression in two important 
ways.  Short term interests are near the zero bound, and there is significant slack in the 
economy with unemployment rates over 9 percent.   
The unemployment challenge was greater in the 1930s because real GDP dropped 
by 30 percent between 1929 and 1933 and unemployment rates exceeded 20 percent for 
four years and stayed above 14 percent for most of the decade.  In contrast to the recent 
situation, in the 1930s the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations financed most of the 
increase in federal spending with taxes and thus ran relatively small fiscal deficits.  
However, as is the case today, there was substantial variation in the distribution of federal 
funds per capita across states that can be used to examine multipliers for federal spending 
in each state on state incomes.    
In this paper, we construct measures of federal government spending in each state 
for the period 1930 through 1940 and then estimate the impact of federal government 
spending in the state on the state’s per capita incomes, employment, and other measures 
of economic activity.  In estimating the multipliers, we use several different measures of 
federal spending:  grants, grants and loans, nontransfer grants, nonfarm grants, and Fishback and Kachanovskaya  2
Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) payments to farmers to take land out of 
production.   
The multipliers are estimated using controls for time-varying weather patterns in 
the states, state fixed effects, year effects, and state-specific time trends, as well as 
instrumental variable techniques.  Multipliers from most specifications with fixed effects 
and no instruments were well below one.  We use two different instrumental variable 
(IV) strategies and multiple specifications and therefore report several estimates for each 
multiplier.  The IV estimates of the state per capita personal income multiplier with 
respect to per capita federal grants were around 1.1.  Some point estimates for multipliers 
for nontransfer grants and nonfarm grants were higher but not statistically significantly 
different from one.  There is some evidence that AAA farm grants had negative or no 
effect on personal income.  Federal grants had stronger effects on consumption than on 
personal income, but they had no positive effect on various measures of private 
employment.   
 
The Recent Literature on Multipliers 
Much of the focus of the recent literature on multipliers has been on 
macroeconomic multipliers for the national economy.   The traditional Keynesian 
macroeconomic model predicts relatively high multipliers associated with high marginal 
propensities to consume, while neoclassical models predict low multipliers through 
crowding out of investment and consumption in part due to anticipation of future tax 
liabilities.  Neo-Keynesian models that combine neoclassical modeling with frictions in 
the economy suggest multipliers somewhere in between.   Fishback and Kachanovskaya  3
Most of the empirical macroeconomic estimates for short run multipliers imply 
that a dollar increase in government spending is associated with an increase in income 
that ranges from about 50 cents to $1.30, or multipliers of 0.5 to 1.3. Some estimates 
range as high as 1.8.  The variation comes in part from differences in strategies for 
resolving endogeneity problems that arise when policy makers use fiscal policy to try to 
counteract downturns.  The methods range from use of Vector Autoregressive (VAR) 
models to identification of changes in military spending and tax policy that might be 
plausibly considered to be unrelated to the macroeconomy.  Recent efforts examine the 
impact of unexpected changes in these plausibly exogenous factors.  The results also may 
vary due to the period studied, as the multiplier is predicted to be larger in times of high 
unemployment and in periods when interest rates are fixed or near the zero bound.2   
  It is difficult to estimate a national multiplier during the 1930s because it is hard 
to argue that federal spending was not rising in response to the downturn, and finding an 
instrument for federal spending in a national regression is difficult.  Any estimate is 
likely to be for a balanced-budget multiplier because the deficits were very small relative 
to the size of the problem.  Scholars have repeatedly shown that the New Deal was not a 
                                                 
2 See Valerie Ramey’s (2011) survey of multipliers for an upcoming issue of the Journal of Economic 
Literature.  The third edition of Dornbusch and Fischer’s Macroeconomics in 1984 (p. 148) reports 
multiplier estimates for an increase in net government spending of 1.8 from DRI and 0.7 from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  Key papers on the macroeconomic multiplier include Aiyagari, Christiano, and 
Eichenbaum (1992), Barro (1981); Barro and Redlick (forthcoming 2011), Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 
Blinder and Zandi (2010), Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2009), Devereux, Head, and Lapham 
(1996),  Hall (1980),  Pereira and Flores de Frutos (1999) Ramey (forthcoming 2011),  Ramey and Shapiro 
(1998), Romer 1992, Zandi (2009).  Average tax multipliers tend to be somewhat higher (Romer and 
Romer 2010).  In estimates of the impact of fiscal and monetary policy for the 1920s and 1930s from a 
panel of countries,  Almunia, Benetrix, Eichengreen, O’Rourke, and Rua.find a multiplier for military 
spending above 2.  Ethan Ilzetski, Enrique Mendoza, and Carlos Vegh (2010) find smaller multipliers for 
government consumption using panel SVAR methods on a modern panel of countries, although the 
multipliers vary across conditions.      Fishback and Kachanovskaya  4
Keynesian attempt to deal with the Depression.3   On the other hand, there was 
tremendous variation in the amount of per capita federal grants and loans distributed 
across the states during the New Deal and federal funds to each state fluctuated over the 
course of the decade.  This variation can be used to identify the impact of distributing 
additional federal funds within a typical state on the income in the state.   
The state-level multiplier is not the same as the federal multiplier.  Nakamura and 
Steinsson (2011) suggest that state multipliers for federal spending are useful as estimates 
of the multiplier in a small open economy in a currency union with free movement across 
borders.  However, there is likely to be cross-subsidization in the state multiplier for 
federal spending that is not present at the national level.  A national multiplier for federal 
spending addresses a situation where all of the taxation and obligations to repay future 
debt are centered within the economy where the money is spent (Barro 1982).  In 
contrast, a state can receive federal funds but might bear less than (or more than) its full 
share of the tax and debt obligation associated with funds.  They develop a model that 
shows that the relationship between state multipliers and the overall national multiplier 
can vary a great deal depending on a variety of assumptions, ranging from the extent of 
national unemployment to the variability of interest rates.  In a political economy model, 
the state multiplier serves another purpose by determining the benefit that the state’s 
residents anticipate receiving when seeking federal government funds.      
Our estimates for the Depression therefore are most comparable to estimates 
from a series of recent working papers on the impact of federal spending on state and 
                                                 
3 Keynes chastised Roosevelt in letters to the editor for not running deficits to finance the rise in federal 
spending.  E. Cary Brown (1956) and Larry Peppers (1973) both performed analysis to show that the 
deficits run were very small relative to the size that Keynesians would have recommended.   Fishback and Kachanovskaya  5
local economies between 1980 and the present.4  Juan Carlos Suarez Serrato and Phillipe 
Wingender develop local fiscal multiplier estimates for the modern era in the U.S. using 
changes in the distribution of federal spending across districts driven by updated local 
population estimates from the decennial Census.  Using first-difference estimation on 
panels at the county, state, and MSA level after 1983, they report an income multiplier 
estimate of 1.88 and an estimated cost per job created of $30,000 per year. 
Daniel Wilson (2011) estimates jobs multipliers for the federal distribution of 
funds under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009.  He relied 
on the exogenous formulas for allocation of spending as the source of identification and 
finds that the ARRA saved roughly one job per $100,000 spent and had its strongest 
impact on construction employment.  Emi Nakamura and Jon Steinsson (2010) estimate 
state level multipliers based on variations in military procurement spending during 
periods of military buildups between 1966 and 2006.  To control for endogeneity, they 
construct an instrument based on regressing each state’s military procurement spending 
on total U.S. military spending; therefore, the instrument for a state in year t is the 
coefficient from that state’s regression times U.S. military spending in year t.   Their 
results suggest a multiplier of 1.5, which is not sensitive to how strongly monetary policy 
leans against the wind.   
                                                 
4Another set of studies seek to estimate the impact of state government spending within the same 
state.   Daniel Shoag (2010) estimates multipliers within states for state government spending using 
“windfalls” in returns on state pension assets as an instrument for state government spending.  The 
estimates suggest an income multiplier of $2.12 and the generation of an additional job per $35,000 spent.    
Jeffrey Clemens and Stephen Miran (2011) examine the impact of state spending on state income using 
budget rules for state deficit finance and differences between forecasted state budgets and actual state 
budgets for identification.   However, these sources of variation in state fiscal policy did not serve as strong 
instruments.         
 Fishback and Kachanovskaya  6
Cohen, Coval, and Malloy (2010) use changes in federal spending related to 
changes in key Congressional committee assignments to show that increases in federal 
spending are associated with reductions in private investment and employment in the 
states.  In a study of low income countries Aart Kraay (2010) finds a multiplier of less 
than one for World bank lending using fluctuations in approval of projects as a source of 
variation in later spending that is uncorrelated with current output.    
Regional scientists also have developed a broad range of theoretical models that 
lead to multipliers for net income coming into a state.5   The models range from the early 
Keynesian regional models to input-output models to economic base models to neo-
classical models.6    The earlier empirical work on regional multipliers led to a broad 
range of estimates of multipliers of between 0.5 and 2 depending on the technique used.  
Some relied on simulations that derive multipliers using input-output models and surveys 
                                                 
5 There is a large literature on the impact of public infrastructure spending at the state level.   Hulten and 
Schwab (1991) conclude that the link between public infrastructure and states’ economic growth is weak, 
as the states that expanded public infrastructure the most in the 1970s were not the ones that developed 
faster during that period.  Munnell (1992 192) finds a significant effect of public capital on state-level 
output, investment and employment growth, although the effects of government spending at the state level 
are smaller than at the national level.  Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1992) constructed a panel of 48 states 
from 1969 until 1983 to estimate input elasticity coefficients of regional Cobb-Douglas production 
functions and concluded that government provided goods, such as highways and education, have a 
significant and positive effect on state’s output.  Costa, Ellison, and Martin (1987) consider a translog 
production function and conclude that public capital and labor are complementary inputs.  The estimated 
elasticities of output with respect to public are around one in all states.  Meanwhile, Blanchard and Katz 
(1992) model the effects of negative one-percent employment shocks to a wide range of variables using 
data from U.S. states from 1947 to 1990 and find sizeable effects on per capita income over an extended 
number of years.     
Duffy-Deno and Eberts (1991) study the effect of the public capital stock on the state’s economic 
growth, first, without using capital expenditures as a proxy for capital stock, and second, considering public 
capital both exogenous to the firm and endogenous to the local community positing a simultaneous 
relationship of public capital and local economic growth.  The authors find a positive and statistically 
significant effect of public capital on state’s economic growth rate.   
Assessing a link between public capital and economic growth, Fernald (1999) studies the direction 
of causation between public capital and productivity and unsurprisingly concludes that road construction 
(which is one of the biggest components of public spending) causes a surge in productivity in industries 
with high motor-vehicle use.  David Aschauer (1989) also finds that road construction bears the most 
explanatory power of the change of local productivity, while military spending has almost none. 
6 Richardson (1985) surveys all but the neoclassical models.  Merrifeld (1987 and 1990) and 
McGregor, McVittie, Swales, and Yin (2000) for examples of neoclassical multipliers for the economic 
base. Fishback and Kachanovskaya  7
that describe the degree to which different industries rely on local labor and external 
inputs and capital.  Others rely on Ordinary Least Squares regression estimates (Mulligan 
(2005, 1987).  
The coefficient on federal spending in a regional model will be determined by a 
series of factors.7   It will have positive effects to the extent that it puts to work 
unemployed resources; it is more productive than the private spending that is replaced by 
the anticipation of future obligations for taxpayers; it produces social overhead capital 
(like roads, sanitation, public health programs) that make the inputs in the state economy 
more productive; and/or it leads to multiplier effects.  The Keynesian multiplier model 
arises as each income recipient purchases goods and services from others in the state 
who, in turn, spend their receipts on goods and services produced by others in the state.  
The regional neoclassical multiplier arises as labor demand is pushed out along an 
upward sloping labor supply curve.    
The positive benefits of the multiplier are diminished through a variety of 
“leakages” when the money spent in the process is spent on goods and services outside 
the state economy.   Much of the federal grant spending on work relief programs, like the 
FERA, WPA, or CWA, had small initial leakages because over 80 percent was spent on 
wages for people in the state.  Grants from the Public Works Administration and Public 
Roads Administration had larger initial leakages because more than 50 percent of the 
monies were spent on materials and equipment imported from other states.   More 
                                                 
7The intuitive discussion of the multiplier is based on a Keynesian discussion of consumption and 
imports.  See Cullen and Fishback (2007) and Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor (2005b) for how this works in 
a simple model.  Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) have a neo-Keynesian model that leads to the same 
implications. Fishback and Kachanovskaya  8
leakages occurred to the extent that workers on federal projects spent their wages on 
goods and services produced outside the state.    
Federal spending will have smaller positive effects on the economy to the extent 
that it leads people to save in anticipation that they will have to pay future taxes.  The 
federal spending will have an even weaker effect to the extent that it replaces local 
production of goods and services.  An influx of federal spending might bid up local 
wages in ways that raised the costs of hiring labor to private producers.  It may have also 
bid up the prices for non-labor inputs with the same effect.  The most obvious crowding 
out came from the AAA payments to farmers to take land out of production.  The stated 
purpose of the act was to reduce output in hopes of raising prices enough to see an 
increase in income.   In other cases, the federal spending may have replaced state and 
local projects that would have been built in the absence of federal spending.   The impact 
of the reduction in state and local spending was likely to be small because states were 
generally required to run balanced budgets.  Even when they ran deficits in the early 
1930s, the deficits were relatively small as a share of state and local spending.   
 
The Impact of Federal Spending in the 1930s. 
There have been some estimates of the impact of New Deal spending on general 
economic activity.  At the macroeconomic level, Christina Romer (1992) calculated a 
fiscal multiplier of only 0.23 in a difference-in-difference estimate that examined the 
change in federal funds distributed after the Veterans’ Bonus was passed out in 1936.  In 
simulations from a dynamic structural general equilibrium model Gauti Eggertsson 
(2008) finds that the combination of increased federal spending, the move off of the gold Fishback and Kachanovskaya  9
standard, the zero interest bound, and government efforts to raise wages and prices 
through the National Recovery Administration led to a strong turnaround in the economy.   
In microeconomic studies using variation across time and place, Fishback, 
Horrace, and Kantor (2005, 2006) showed a strong positive influence of public works and 
relief spending on county-level retail sales and net-migration.  In studies of panel data for 
cities between 1929 and 1940 Fishback, Haines and Kantor (2007) and Johnson, Fishback 
and Kantor (2010) show that relief spending contributed to reductions in mortality and 
crime rates and increases in birth rates.  On the other hand, Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration (AAA) grants had a slightly negative effect on retail sales growth and net 
migration.  Garrett and Wheelock (2006) found similar positive effects of overall New 
Deal spending in a cross-sectional analysis of the growth rate in state personal income per 
capita for the entire period 1933 to 1939 and New Deal spending during that period.  
However, neither paper shows the effects of a multiplier on income in the same year.   
Studies of labor markets using panel data from 1930s have focused on the impact 
of relief spending on labor markets.  Neuman, Fishback, and Kantor (2010) examine 
monthly data from 1933 through 1940 for over 40 cities and find that relief spending 
raised private employment through 1935 but reduced it afterward.  Benjamin and 
Mathews (1992) find small crowding out effects of private employment from relief jobs 
through 1935 and much larger crowding out effects in the second half of the New Deal.8 
 
Federal Spending in the 1930s  
                                                 
8 We focus on the studies that use panel data here, see Neumann, Fishback, and Kantor (2010) for 
citations to studies relying on cross-sectional estimation. Fishback and Kachanovskaya  10
In response to the hard times between the fiscal years 1929 and 1933, the Hoover 
administration and Congress increased nominal government spending by 52 percent, 88 
percent after adjusting for the tremendous deflation.9   After a decade of no change in 
annual real federal spending, Hoover sought to increase spending through existing 
programs.  As an example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (1932, 49-50) described 
the increase in highway spending in 1932 as a relief and stimulus measure:  “Emergency 
employment was directly provided for varying periods for nearly 200,000 men and 
indirectly for a much larger number in industries that supply necessary materials and 
services.”10  By fiscal years 1932 and 1933 the federal government was running a deficit 
of -4.7 percent of a much reduced GDP as growth in tax revenues failed to keep pace 
with the rise in government spending.   
After Franklin Roosevelt and the new Democratic Congress took office in March 
1933, government spending roughly doubled over the next 6 years.  The rise in spending 
did not lead to large budget deficits because tax revenues rose at roughly the same rate.  
E. Cary Brown (1956) and Claude Peppers (1973) have documented that the federal 
deficits as a share of GDP were small and fell well short of being Keynesian policies 
designed to stimulate the economy.11  On the other hand, the distribution of the federal 
spending varied enormously across states on a per capita basis.  Figure 1 shows the large 
                                                 
9See series Ea584, Ea585, and Ea586 in Wallis (2006, 5-80 and 5-81).  The federal fiscal year ran 
from July 1 in year t-1 to June 30 in year t.  Nearly all of the decisions made about fiscal year 1933 were 
made by the Hoover administration and Congress.  Roosevelt did not take office until early March 1933 
and  very little of the New Deal spending occurred before July 1, 1933.   
10 In 1935 the U.S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics traced the path of $100 million of highway 
spending through the economy until it was paid out as wage or salary income and calculated highway 
spending multipliers of 2.7 for employment and 3 for economic activity.   
11 After July 1931, it appears that monetary policy was relatively uniform across the 12 regional 
federal reserve banks.  Richardson Van Troost (2009) document differences in attitudes toward providing 
reserves to banks in the St. Louis and Atlanta districts in 1930 and the first half of 1931, but St. Louis 
began following similar policies to Atlanta’s in July of that year.  Meltzer (2003) notes that there were 
differences of opinion about how to proceed with open market operations but that nearly all open market 
sales and purchases were made by the New York Federal Reserve Bank.  Fishback and Kachanovskaya  11
variation in the annual changes in per capita federal grants plotted against per capita 
personal income across states for the years 1930 through 1940, all measure in 1967.   The 
changes over time within states after controlling for national shocks in each year is the 
source of variation used to identify the multipliers. 
   
The Composition of Federal Spending 
  Understanding of the impact of federal spending and taxation during the New 
Deal era is complicated by the great diversity of programs.  The New Deal funding 
programs were divided into two major classifications:  nonrepayable grants and repayable 
loans.12   The Office of Government Reports (OGR) (1940) reported the total amount 
spent by each program in each state in each year from July 1, 1932 through June 30, 
1939.   The OGR mimeos do not document where they obtained the spending figures.  To 
double check the OGR data and extend the series for programs back to 1930 and forward 
to 1940, we went through a large number of reports from various agencies and the 
Treasury department to double check the numbers.  The data appendix describes the 
sources we used and some of the inconsistencies we found.  In addition, we added 
information that the OGR did not report on the construction and maintenance spending 
on Hoover (Boulder) Dam and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and the loans and 
cash grants on the World War I adjusted service certificates that were associated with the 
Veterans’ Bonus.  The totals and the amounts per capita for the period 1933 through 1939 
are reported in Table I to get a sense of the size of each program. 
                                                 
12The Office of Government Reports offered information on the value of housing loans insured 
by the Federal Housing Administration.  Since these loans were private loans, we do not incorporate these 
into the analysis of net federal spending.     Fishback and Kachanovskaya  12
  The main focus in the analysis is on nonrepayable grants from the federal 
government.  About 62 percent of the grants were associated with relief programs.  All of 
the Works Progress Administration (WPA), Civilian Conservation Corps (CCCG), and 
Civil Works Administration (CWA) grants and roughly half of the Federal Emergency 
Relief Administration (FERA) were spent on poverty relief projects with work 
requirements and could be considered federal expenditures because they produced a good 
or service.  The Social Security Act Programs (SSA), and the rest of the FERA grants 
were New Deal programs that offered transfer payments to alleviate poverty.  The 
Veterans’ Administration (VA) and Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Homes (SOLD) were grant 
programs in place before the New Deal that provided pensions, disability payments, and 
living support to military veterans.  Grants from the SSA programs provided matching 
grants to states that provided aid to dependent children (ADC), old-age assistance (OAA), 
and aid-to-the-blind (AB).  If we performed the analysis for the U.S. as a whole, the 
transfer payments from the SSA, part of the FERA, the VA, and the SOLD, which 
account for roughly 20 percent of the grants, would not necessarily be treated as 
expenditures because they are net transfers within the system.  However, at the state level 
these transfer grants become income that influenced purchasing power within each state, 
and therefore the Bureau of Economic Analysis included them in their personal income 
estimates; therefore, we incorporate them into the analysis.   
The second major grant category is public works programs, which accounted for 
19.4 percent of the grants.  The Public Works Administration Federal (PWAF) and 
Nonfederal (PWANF) programs, Public Roads Administration, Public Buildings 
Administration (PBA), Rivers and Harbors Grant (RH) and other smaller programs listed Fishback and Kachanovskaya  13
as public works in the table were not poverty programs.  All but the PWA programs were 
long run federal programs established before the New Deal. Unlike the work relief 
poverty programs, the public works programs could hire from the labor market and faced 
fewer restrictions on hours worked.  They also paid average hourly wages that were 
roughly double those on the work relief programs.    
  Approximately 12 percent of the grants were devoted to agriculture from 
programs run by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), Soil and 
Conservation Service (SCS), Farm Security Administration (FSA), and Agriculturual 
Experiment Stations (AES).  The AAA was the major New Deal program which was 
devoted to payments to farmers to take land out of production.  The initial AAA program 
was funded with an agricultural processing tax until it was declared unconstitutional in 
January 1936.13  The AAA also administered the replacement program adopted under 
the Soil and Domestic Conservation Act of 1936, which continued to make payments to 
farmers to take land out of production without the processing tax.  The FSA started 
within the FERA relief program and was more of a poverty relief program.  The SCS 
began before the AAA was declared unconstitutional and provided grants for training 
farmers about soil conservation techniques.   
     It is not always clear how to treat the federal loans in terms of developing a 
multiplier.  They are not government spending because at the time the loans were made 
they all required repayment.   However, loan distributions are often listed in the budget 
deficit figures.  As one example, the OGR treated the loans for construction of irrigation 
projects through the Bureau of Reclamation as grants.  The loans were interest-free and 
                                                 
13AAA grants per capita were not very strongly correlated with processing tax receipts in cross-
sectional correlations.  The correlation for 1934 was only 0.034 and for 1935 was 0.1677. Fishback and Kachanovskaya  14
the repayments were often delayed for a long time period, and in a number of cases the 
loans were forgiven. Following the OGR practice, we treated the Bureau of Reclamation 
funds as grants in this analysis.   
  Nearly all of the rest of the loans were repaid, and thus were treated separately as 
a loan category.14  There was a grant feature to the loans to the extent that they provided 
subsidies in the form of lower interest rates and better lending terms.  The Home Owners’ 
Loan Corporation (HOLC), for example, bought over 1 million mortgages that were on 
the verge of foreclosure at close to the full book values of the loans and then refinanced 
them for the original borrower at interest rates that were below market interest rates on 
good loans.  The HOLC also extended the standard repayment period, and allowed much 
smaller down payments relative to the value of the home.  The Farm Credit 
Administration (FCA) loans provided good terms for farm mortgages and short-term 
loans for crops, seed, and tools.15  The subsidies in Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
(RFC) loans likely varied by type of loan.  Given the measurement issues with loans, we 
include multiplier estimates where we add 10 percent of the value of the loans as a 
measure of the interest subsidy to the grants.  We also run estimates where we add the 
full value of the loans to the grants.   
World War I service-adjusted certificates, associated with the Veterans’ Bonus of 
1936, are divided into two categories, loans and death benefit grants before January 1936 
                                                 
14 There were some cases of loan forgiveness.  In the case we know about, the RFC loans offered 
to cities for poverty relief under the Hoover administration in fiscal year 1933 were eventually forgiven by 
the Roosevelt administration.   The HOLC likely experienced the highest loan default rate because it 
foreclosed on 20 percent of the mortgages that it supported.   Our sense from reading the reports of the 
various agencies, is that they anticipated repayment and were active in seeking repayment or recovery of 
assets to be sold when there was a default.     
15The Commodity Credit Corporation loan program provided nonrecourse loans that established a 
price floor for the commodities produced.  The CCC loan information has been eliminated from the 
analysis because the loans were not reported across states in fiscal 1934 and major portions of the loans 
were not reported across states in other years.   Fishback and Kachanovskaya  15
and grants after that date.  Since Cone and the BEA incorporated both the loans and 
grants in their measure of personal income, these deserve direct attention. In 1924 
Congress enacted an adjusted-service certificate program for men and women who served 
in World War I.   The program offered certificates that could be redeemed at face value 
twenty years after receipt.  The amount to be paid was $1 for each day served in World 
War I inside the U.S. and $1.25 for each day overseas, and then the amount was 
multiplied by 1.25 to take into account the delay in payment.  Certificates valued at less 
than $50 were paid in cash immediately and the cash value of the certificate was paid out 
to heirs at the time of the veterans’ death.  These payments are treated as grants 
throughout.   
Living veterans could also borrow from the Veterans’ Bureau against the 
certificates by accepting a lien on the value of the certificate.  They could pay back the 
loan and receive the full certificate value in 1945 or not repay and accept the amount left 
after interest was deducted in 1945.  After Congress lowered the maximum interest on the 
loans to 4.5 percent (and soon after to 3.5) and increased the amount that could be 
borrowed to half of the value of the adjusted service certificate on February 27, 1931, 
World War I veterans took out 2 million loans valued at $795 million within the next few 
months.  In January 1936 the Veterans’ Bonus Bill allowed veterans to convert the 
adjusted-service certificates to cash at the full face value.  If veterans held them for more 
than one year they could receive the face value plus 3 percent interest per year until 
maturity on June 15, 1945.  The VA received 3.3 million applications with a face value of 
$3.2 billion for settlement by June 30, 1936.  After deducting outstanding liens from 
loans, the VA paid out $1.7 billion in cash.  Since the payment of liens released veterans Fishback and Kachanovskaya  16
from making future payments on loans, we treat the entire $3.2 billion as grants 
(Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs 1931, pp. 10, 42-44; 1936, pp. 1, 22-24).   In the 
analysis that combines loans and grants, however, the $3.2 million in grants was offset by 
the repayment of $1.5 billion in loans, so the combined value of grants and loans for the 
adjusted service certificates in 1936 is $1.7 billion.   
 
Federal Tax Policy in the 1930s 
Federal taxation in the 1930s was relatively simple in that all tax rates were the 
same across all states for each activity in each year.  However, the tax structure during 
the 1930s was quite different from the post-War economy, in which the vast majority of 
internal tax revenues come from taxes on income in the form of corporate, personal, and 
employment (social security and unemployment insurance) taxes.  Between 1930 and 
1940 the sources of federal revenue shifted dramatically away from income taxes toward 
excise taxes.  Less than 10 percent of households earned enough to pay personal income 
taxes throughout the 1930s.16  In 1930 personal income taxes accounted for 38% of total 
internal revenue and corporate income taxes composed 42%.  The Tax Revenue Act of 
1932 led to several major changes.  Even though income tax rates were increased, the 
share of revenue from personal income taxes fell markedly to 16% in 1934 and 18% in 
1940, while the share from corporate income taxes fell to 15% in 1934 before rising to 
21% in 1940.  The big revenue sources that arose from the 1932 tax changes was an 
expansion in excise taxes to cover manufactures of autos, tires, gasoline, lubricants and 
taxes on pipelines, telephones, telegraphs, and electricity.  The share of internal revenue 
                                                 
16 Households did not begin paying income taxes before income hit $2,000 for individuals and 
$5,000 for a family of four at a time when most workers were earning $1,000 or less.   Fishback and Kachanovskaya  17
from excise taxes rose from 19% in 1930 to 28% in 1933.  In 1933 the Roosevelt 
administration added in processing taxes on agricultural goods, a capital stock tax and 
eliminated Prohibition.  The excise tax share jumped to 48% in 1934.  Over the rest of the 
decade the excise tax share fell back to 35%, although the share of revenue from alcohol 
taxes remained steady around 12%.17  
Aside from tax rate changes, the driving force behind changes in tax revenue 
within a state over time were changes in economic activity.  Between 1930 and 1940 the 
correlations across time between real per capita personal income and real per capita taxes 
within the same state ranged from 0.95 in Georgia to 0.3624 in South Carolina.  It was 
above 0.8 for 22 states, between 0.7 and 0.8 in 18 states, between 0.6 and 0.7 in 5 states, 
0.4913 in Nebraska, 0.4423 in Kansas, and 0.3624 in South Carolina.  The taxation is so 
strongly tied to income levels that it is difficult to find instruments for taxation that are 
not also strong correlates of income.   
We deal with federal taxation empirically in two ways.   Since national tax rates 
were the same across all states, the simplest way is to incorporate year fixed effects that 
control for tax rate changes in a model of state per capita income as a function of national 
government spending per capita in the state.  Essentially, the model shows the multiplier 
of federal spending for state personal income after controlling for the fiscal drag created 
by the tax rate system.  We also estimate the model with a dependent variable of per 
capita state income as a function of real per capita national government spending minus 
real per capita national taxes.  This is the multiplier for income from federal government 
spending net of taxes.   
 
                                                 
17Shares calculated from Wallis (2006, 5-86).    Fishback and Kachanovskaya  18
Measures of Economic Activity  
  The impact of federal spending is estimated for several measures of economic 
activity.  The broadest measure is state personal income per capita, which has been 
estimated and reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis since the 1930s.   Frederick 
Cone (1940, 3, 10, 13, 39), who helped develop the early estimates, described personal 
income as a measure of the “ability of consumers to purchase the new goods and services 
currently produced by business enterprises.”  With that in mind personal income was 
defined as national income after subtracting business savings, social security 
contributions from employer and employee, contributions to the Railroad Retirement 
Fund, and contributions to retirement systems for government employees on the grounds 
that these were not available for spending.   To capture purchasing power, the BEA added 
back many transfer payments, including direct and work relief, federal pensions to 
veterans, adjusted service benefits (both loans in the early 1930s and the Veterans’ 
Bonus), other government retirement allowances, unemployment compensation, railroad 
insurance benefits, old-age insurance benefits, and agriculture benefit payments.18     
Direct relief accounted for about 1.4 percent, retirement payments for veterans and 
federal workers accounted for about 1 percent, and the World War I adjusted service 
certificates payouts reached peaks of 1.4 percent of income (in the form of loans) in 1931 
                                                 
18Cone (1940, p. 8) made the following argument for inclusion of the World War I veterans’ 
loans and then 1936 cash payout on adjusted service certificates as personal income:  “because these 
disbursements of the Federal Government were in the nature of original receipts to the veterans and 
because, owing to the large volume of the disbursements and their wide distribution among 3,000,000 
veterans, they represented an important stimulus to consumption on two distinct occasions, they have been 
incorporated.” Fishback and Kachanovskaya  19
and 2.1 percent (in the form of cash) in 1936 with negligible amounts in between (Cone, 
1940, 10, 24-5).19   
  We also estimate the model with measures of wage and salary income net of 
payroll taxes and several other measures of economic activity.  The wage and salary 
income, which is net of pay-roll deductions for social insurance, accounted for about 62.5 
percent of personal income in the 1930s (Martin and Creamer, 1942, p. 23).   
Measurement error is also an issue with the wage and salary income personal income data 
because the information on some components had to be interpolated between census 
years and from scattered components.  The most accurately measured information is the 
wage component of wage and salary income because it relies heavily on the monthly 
establishment surveys collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics during this period.  The 
BLS suggested that about 48 percent of employment was covered by the survey in 1938 
(Cone, 1940, 31).     
To further reduce problems with measurement error and also examine in more 
depth where the stimulus occurred, we examine several other series:  census reports on 
manufacturing payroll per capita in the odd years from 1929 through 1939, and the retail 
census estimates of per capita retail sales for the years 1929, 1933, 1935, and 1939.  
These two measures are particularly valuable because they are based on nationwide 
censuses of all establishments.  There are several additional measures of income and 
spending that are not available in dollar terms, including per capita measures of John 
                                                 
19 We have been trying to develop a measure of income that does not include transfers and thus is 
a more production based measure.  The new measure starts with the BEA measure of personal income.  We 
have been collecting evidence by state that will allow us to subtract transfers without a work relief 
component and add back payroll taxes for social insurance and contributions to government pension plans.  
Work relief is treated as production income because it was related to production.  Since we are not privy to 
the exact sources used to construct personal income, there is a risk of adding measurement when we make 
the adjustments. 
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Wallis’s (1989) broad-based employment index built up from BLS employer surveys for 
1929 through 1939,20 newly computerized payroll indices for 1932 to 1939 for the same 
group of industries, and per capita auto registrations, to capture the effect of government 
spending on a major consumer durable.   The employment and payroll indices rely very 
little on interpolation but there may be sampling error in each state because the series are 
based on month-to-month comparisons of the same employers from surveys that rotate 
employers out of the sample (Wallis, 1989; Neumann, Fishback, and Kantor 2010).  
Wallis (1989) used benchmarks to resolve some of these problems for the broad-based 
employer index, but the payroll indices have not been benchmarked.  The automobile 
registrations also are measured well, as the states collected license revenue from the 
automobiles.   
 
Estimation Procedure 
Despite the variety of different models that generate income multipliers of 
government spending, the empirical estimations of multipliers tend to be similar and use 
reduced form models with a sparse set of correlates.  Both Barro and Redlick (2010) and 
Romer and Romer (2006) express worries about omitted variable bias that might arise 
from the absence of exogenous factors in the model.  To estimate the multiplier, we use 
panel data methods with a measure of real per capita state income (yit) in state i and year t 
in 1967 dollars as the dependent variable as a function of a measure of real per capita 
federal spending in state i and year t (git),   
 
                                                 
20 The broad-based index includes manufacturing wages only; mining wages only; street 
railways; telephone and telegraph; electric light, power, and gas; insurance; brokerage; wholesale and retail 
trade; year-round hotels; and laundry and dry-cleaning establishments. Fishback and Kachanovskaya  21
yit = β0 + β1 git + β2 W + S +Y + S* t + εit. 
 
To control for omitted variables that might have influenced government policy and state 
income, we include several vectors.  A vector of extreme weather (W) variables—days 
with temperatures over 90, days with temperatures below 0, months of extreme or severe 
drought, and months of extreme or severe wetness, and precipitation--controls for the 
influence of these factors on crop production and prices in the farm sector, construction 
activity, and other activities where weather was a factor.  A vector of state fixed effects 
(S) controls for factors like geography, state constitutions, and the basic economic, 
cultural, and demographic structure of each state that did not change over time but varied 
across states.   A vector of year fixed effects (Y) controls for national changes in the 
economy that affected all states in each year, including monetary policy changes, changes 
in federal tax rates, the introduction and elimination of the National Recovery 
Administration and other changes in national regulation.  A vector of state specific time 
trends (S*t) control for differences in the trend paths of economic activity in each state, 
including the shift away from state budget deficits in the early 1930s to budget surpluses 
in the late 1930s.  Under the complete model specification the identification of the 
multiplier β1 for net New Deal spending comes from the deviation from trend across time 
within states after controlling for nation-wide shocks.21   
  The model can also be estimated in year-to-year first differences to control for 
time-invariant state effects.  In the difference model state time trends are controlled with 
the addition of state fixed effects.  Both methods lead to unbiased and consistent 
                                                 
21 We have also tried estimating the model while including squared terms.  The estimates at the 
mean of the sample are very similar and there is very little gain from adding the squared terms.  In addition, 
the instruments did not have adequate strength to separate the coefficients for the squared terms.    Fishback and Kachanovskaya  22
estimates of the multiplier in large samples, but the standard errors are more efficiently 
estimated by the difference estimation if there is serial correlation (Wooldridge 2006, 
491-2).  Since the sample is relatively small with 48 states for 11 years each, we report 
both sets of estimates.  Following Barro and Redlick (2011), Kraay (2010) and Nakamura 
and Steinsson (2010), we have also estimated the model as the growth rate in income 
from the previous year as a function of the change in government spending divided by 
lagged income.  The use of the growth rate matches more common macroeconomic 
specifications, while the normalization of government spending by dividing by lagged 
income allows the coefficient to be interpreted as a dollar-for-dollar multiplier.  
  There are a variety of other factors that may have changed over time in non-trend 
ways that may have influenced both net fiscal federal spending and per capita income in 
the state.   There are two problems that arise in trying to control for these other factors.  
First, many that might be included as controls in a productivity model, such as wages, 
employment, and interest rates, are themselves components of personal income.   By 
controlling for them we would be restricting the measure of the impact of net federal 
expenditures to the parts of state income for which we have not controlled.  Second, 
controls for age, race, ethnicity, population, and the structure of the economy are all 
available typically only during the census years and thus measures would have to be 
interpolated between census years to provide values.   Essentially, the interpolated 
measures of the census-year structural variables between 1930 and 1940 would be linear 
combinations of the state-specific time trends and/or the state effects.             
Third, state and local government spending and taxation are currently controlled 
for with the combination of the state fixed effects and state-specific time trends.   Thus Fishback and Kachanovskaya  23
deviations in trend state fiscal activity is not being controlled.  The multiplier estimate 
therefore may incorporate influences on income that arise from correlations between 
deviations from trend in state and local fiscal activity and federal spending.  Since federal 
spending drove some state decisions, this might not be a disadvantage.  As it stands 
today, comparable annual estimates of revenues and governmental cost payments in the 
states are available only up through 1931 and after 1936 for all states; therefore, any 
estimate incorporating controls for net state spending would miss a very large portion of 
the New Deal period.  Information is available on cities over 100,000 people throughout 
the 1930s, but data for the rest of the governments is available only for 1932.22    
  There still remains the possibility of biases from simultaneity and endogeneity.   
An ample literature on the geographic distribution of New Deal spending shows that the 
Roosevelt Administration tended to distribute more New Deal grants to areas where 
income was declining (see Wallis 1998, Fleck 2008, Fishback, Kantor, and Wallis, 2003; 
Neumann, Fishback, and Kantor 2010).  This tendency imparts a negative bias to the 
multiplier coefficient.  To eliminate the biases arising from the issues described above, 
we follow an instrumental variable strategy.  To be effective, the instrument must vary 
annually both across time and across space and be strongly correlated with the measures 
of federal government funds but not with the error term in the final-stage equation.  
                                                 
22The federal government stopped collecting the annual information from states for the volume 
Financial Statistics of the States in 1933 after having collected information from 41 states for 1932.  They 
restarted by collecting the data for 1937 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1940, p. vi).   John Wallis, Richard 
Sylla, and John Legler have posted information for 16 states for the period 1933 through 1937 with the 
ICPSR, but it is taking longer than we anticipated to make the data for these states comparable with the 
federal government’s categories.  Working with John Wallis we have been collecting, computerizing, and 
categorizing the information for the remaining states for 1933 through 1937 and for the seven states in 1932 
that the Census Bureau  had not worked with.  We still have about two year’s worth of work to do on the 
project.   Fishback and Kachanovskaya  24
  We develop two instrument strategies each based on a similar logic about the 
distribution of federal spending across states.  Each year the federal government decides 
to distribute a total number of grants while paying attention to the state of the economy 
but not the economy within each state.  In any one year each state’s share of the grants is 
determined by a variety of factors, including economic problems within the state but also 
long run differences across states unrelated to the economy.  Our goal is to use these 
factors unrelated to state-specific economic problems as instrumental variables. 
  Some scholars in the modern studies have tried to use federal rules for 
distribution, but this will not work in the 1930s because the federal government routinely 
ignored the original rules written into the acts setting up the emergency programs.  
Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) follow a strategy of estimating a separate share 
coefficient for each state.  This is equivalent to estimating a first stage in our panel with 
47 state dummies interacted with federal spending.  When we tried this, the Stock-Yogo 
tests for instrument strength suggested that we had weak instrument bias.  We therefore, 
experimented with interactions of regional dummies with federal grant spending per 
capita based on 9 census regions and 4 census regions.  The instrument tests suggested 
that weak instrument bias was less of a problem with the 4 census region interactions, and  
Hausman tests for over-identification in this case do not reject the hypothesis that the 
instruments do not belong in the final stage regression.   
  The second instrument strategy relies more heavily on the finding in the New 
Deal distribution literature that swing voting was the key factor influencing the cross-
state distributions of funds (Wright 1974; Fishback, Kantor, and Wallis 2003; Fleck 
2001, 2008, Wallis 1998, 2001).  It also tries to eliminate potential correlations between Fishback and Kachanovskaya  25
the state-specific portion of the total error for total federal spending and error term for the 
state in the final stage regression.  The instrument is the interaction of two variables:  a 
measure of swing voting in presidential elections up to the year t-1 and aggregate per 
capita federal grant spending in year t in an area well outside the region where the state is 
located.  The swing voting measure is the standard deviation of the percentage voting 
Democrat for president in the state between 1896 and the most recent presidential 
election prior to year t.  The variable varies across time because each state’s value 
changes between 1932 and 1933 and again between 1936 and 1937.  By using the 
measure calculated up through the most recent presidential election before that year, we 
eliminate contemporaneous correlation with factors that influenced income in the state.23  
Given the controls for state fixed effects and state time trends, it seems unlikely that 
swing voting in the presidential elections between 1896 and year t-1 would have been 
correlated with the error for income in the state in year t except through the New Deal 
distribution mechanism.   
  The second variable in the interaction term is federal grant spending in the area 
outside an geographic “moat” around the state of interest.  The moat includes the state’s 
census region (of 9) and nearby census regions to avoid spatial correlation with the error 
term from potential spillovers.  For New England, for example, the moat includes any 
states in New England, the Mid-Atlantic, the East North Central, or the states of Virginia, 
Maryland, Kentucky, or West Virginia; therefore, the component of federal spending for 
the instrument for that state is based on federal spending outside that moat.24 25   
                                                 
23 As an example, the instrument for the year 1932 would include the standard deviation of the 
percent voting for the Democratic presidential candidate from 1896 through 1928.   
24For more detail on the moats for each region, see the data appendix.  Fishback and Kachanovskaya  26
Since AAA grant spending differed markedly from other grant spending in its 
purposes, we also estimate a model with AAA grants and nonAAA grants.  In the first IV 
strategy the instruments using region dummies interacted with federal grant spending per 
capita are reasonably strong.  In the second IV strategy we construct the instrument for 
nonAAA grant spending in a way similar to the manner described above but based on the 
AAA procedure for handing out grants.  For each crop in each year the AAA considered 
past crop output and current market conditions and set a price per acre to offer farmers to 
take land out of production.  Typically, the allotments of acreage for each state were 
based on the average number of acres harvested and the yield per acre in the state over 
the previous five years.  We developed an instrument that partially mimics that process 
while not including state-level information from the sample period on acreage, yields, or 
prices in the area.  We set the basic structure for AAA payments in 1928 before the 
sample starts and then update the instrument each year based on changes in AAA 
spending elsewhere in the country.  AAA spending well outside the region where the 
state was located is multiplied by an agricultural activity measure in 1928 based all crops 
that received AAA subsidies by 1940.26  The 1928 activity measure is the share of U.S. 
crop activity in that state in 1928.  The instrument is expected to have strength because it 
has similarity to the five-year averages that served as the basis of distribution in the 
actual program.  By fixing the share of agricultural activity in 1928 and updating with 
information on AAA spending well outside the region, the instrument should not be 
                                                                                                                                                 
25 If the federal government had established a hard budget constraint nationwide, there might 
have been a negative relationship between spending in the rest of the regions and spending in the state in 
question.  There did not appear to be a hard spending constraint at the national level because Roosevelt and 
the Congress often approved additional funds throughout the years and ran budget deficits in most years. 
26 The AAA started providing grants for different crops in different years.  By using the crops in the 
program as of 1940, we avoid any endogeneity related to the timing of when programs began for each crop.  Fishback and Kachanovskaya  27
correlated with the error in the final stage regression except through its impact on AAA 
spending.     
  
Multipliers for Per Capita State Personal Income 
The state personal incomes are reported on a calendar year basis, while the federal 
spending is reported on a fiscal year basis, covering the period from July 1 in year t-1 to 
June 30 in year t.  This automatically imparts a half-year lag into the model.27  Table II 
shows coefficients and standard errors from a series of estimations with per capita state 
personal income in $1967 as a function of per capita estimates of federal government 
fiscal activity in the state.  The first column shows the coefficient and standard errors for 
per capita federal grants in the level specification as correlates are added cumulatively 
and then IV methods using the region interactions with federal spending as instruments.  
The raw Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimate of 1.04 with no correlates implies that a 
one dollar increase in per capita federal grants increased per capita state income by $1.04.  
Controlling for state fixed effects raises this multiplier estimate to 1.43, and adding 
weather correlates raises it further to 1.56.  The addition of year effects to control for 
nationwide shocks reduces the multiplier to 0.45, and the addition of state-specific time 
trends lowers the estimate further to 0.16.  This last estimate suggests that the federal 
spending crowded out a great deal of local economic activity and/or the impact is 
weakened greatly because the spending quickly leaked out of the local economy.  The 
                                                 
27 We investigated interpolating the federal spending in each state to a calendar-year basis by using state 
level information on monthly employment in programs, but we could not do this for all programs.  Without 
such state-specific information, interpolation runs the risk of incorporating information on government 
spending in the first half of year t+1 into the year t estimate.  We did not carry the process further because 
the interpolation might introduce biases to the extent that state income in year t influences the distribution 
of federal government spending in year t+1.   Fishback and Kachanovskaya  28
results for the other regression specifications show the same pattern of changes in 
coefficients as correlates are added to the analysis.  This pattern typically appears when 
using other measures of government funding and other measures of economic activity.   
Given that the Roosevelt administration distributed more grants to areas where the 
economy was in trouble, we instrument to try to eliminate negative bias in the coefficient.  
The transition to instrumental variables is consistent with negative endogeneity bias, as 
the instrumental variable (IV) coefficients are more positive than the non IV coefficients 
from equations with the same correlates.  The IV estimates that both control for a great 
deal of omitted variable bias and also meet the strongest criteria for instrument strength 
are the ones with controls for weather, state effects, and year effects.  If we are willing to 
accept up to 15 percent weak instrument bias in the size of the coefficient, the critical 
value for rejecting the hypothesis of weak instrument bias at the 10 percent level 
developed by Stock and Yogo (2002a, 2002b) for the Kleibergan-Paap (2006) (KP) 
version of the Donald F-statistic when using robust standard errors is 12.83 with three 
instruments instrument for one right-hand side variable.  The values if one is willing to 
accept 20 and 25 percent bias are 9.54 and 7.80.  The critical values are lower if weak 
instrument bias is measured relative to the bias of the OLS coefficient at 9.08 for 10 
percent relative bias and 6.46 for 20-percent relative bias.   
The IV estimates without year fixed effects generate very high F-statistics that 
reject the hypothesis of weak instrument bias, but the absence of year effects means that 
the effects of monetary policy, federal tax rate changes, the National Recovery 
Administration, and other changes, which were correlated with both income and federal 
grant spending, are incorporated into the coefficient of federal grant spending.  The Fishback and Kachanovskaya  29
addition of year fixed effects eliminates this potential problem and the KP statistics reject 
the hypothesis of 15 percent weak instrument bias when state and year fixed effects are 
included.  The addition of state-specific time trends serves to eliminate potential omitted 
variable bias but at the cost of losing instrument strength, as the F-statistic of 5.03 is not 
high enough to reject 15 to 25 percent weak instrument bias.  Therefore, we will focus the 
discussion on the IV estimates with state and year effects.   
The per capita personal income multiplier estimates for per capita federal grants 
using the IV of region interactions with federal totals vary only slightly when using 
different estimating equations.  The coefficient is 1.11 using level estimation, 1.10 in the 
first difference specification, and 1.13 in the growth rate specification.  Under the 
moat/swing instrument strategy, the level specification leads to a multiplier estimate of 
1.39.  We do not report the difference specifications for the moat-swing instrument 
strategy because the instrument F-statistics are all less than 3, suggesting weak 
instrument bias.  Although each of the estimates is greater than one, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the multiplier is equal to one.  Thus, an additional dollar of federal grants 
may well have increased personal income by no more than the dollar of grant spending 
with no additional benefit in the private sector.    
 
Personal Income Multipliers for Different Types of Federal Funding 
The estimates of multipliers for different federal funding measures in Table III 
show variations in the point estimates for different types of spending.  The multiplier for 
grants net of federal taxes paid from the state hovers around one.   When a dollar in 
federal loans is treated like a dollar in grants and we estimate the effect of the combined Fishback and Kachanovskaya  30
total of grants and loans, we might expect smaller multipliers for the combination of 
grants and loans.  There was a huge surge of loans on World War I adjusted service 
certificates in 1931 when the economy was falling apart, and the size of the Veterans’ 
Bonus was cut nearly in half in 1936 when the economy was growing the cash grants of 
over $3 billion was offset by the repayment of the earlier loans.  The estimates under the 
level specifications in Table III are consistent with this expectation with values of .86 and 
.89.  On the other hand, the difference and growth specifications lead to estimates of 1.54 
and 1.93.   When the loans are treated as providing a subsidy of 10 percent of the loan 
value, the multipliers for grants and 10 percent of loans are very close to the multiplier 
for grants alone reported in Table II and at the top of Table III.     
There is some sign that specific types of grants may have had stronger effects.  
When direct transfers to the poor are removed from the grants and the focus is on 
government purchases, the multiplier estimate is as high as 2.18 in the level specification 
using the moat-swing instrument strategy and exceeds 1.4 in two other specifications.  On 
the other hand, the estimate is also only 0.38 in the first-difference specification.   
Given that the AAA farm grants were designed to take land out of production, we 
expected that the nonAAA grants would have stronger effects than all grants and that the 
AAA potentially had negative effects on personal income.  Three of the four sets of 
estimates are consistent with this view.  The multipliers for nonAAA grants vary from 
0.94 to 1.79, while the AAA grant coefficients are negative in three specifications 
although very large and positive in the level specification using the region interaction 
instruments.  The findings of the positive effect of nonAAA grants and negative effects 
of AAA grants are similar to Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor’s (2005, 2006) findings Fishback and Kachanovskaya  31
using county level data.  Using a different instrument strategy, they find that public works 
and relief were associated with higher retail sales and net in-migration, and that AAA 
grants were associated with slightly lower retail sales and net out-migration. The 
payments would have benefitted farm owners and those tenants who received a share of 
the AAA payments.  On the other hand, the likely reduction in the demand for farm labor 
would have reduced wages and employment for farm workers and share croppers 
(Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor (2005, 2006).28 
 Even though the results in Table III show variations in the multiplier for different 
forms of spending, it is important to note that the standard errors of the estimates are 
large enough that we cannot reject a multiplier of one for nearly every estimate.  Further, 
the comparisons of multipliers for different types of government funding do not match 
for each estimation procedure.  For example, in looking down the columns for the growth 
rate specification, the largest multiplier of 1.93 is the one for grants and the full value of 
loans. In contrast, the multiplier for grants and the full value of loans is lowest in the two 
level specifications.    
   
The Impact of Federal Grants on Various Measures of Economic Activity 
                                                 
28The policy was designed to raise prices for farmers.  The negative effect on real personal 
income from the price rise was likely to have been felt nationwide for crops with national markets.   This 
change would have led to a rise in the CPI and a reduction in real income nationwide that would show up in 
the coefficients of the year dummies.  In that sense, the multiplier estimate will be overstated.   There may 
have been differential effects within states due to differences in the consumer prices based on distance 
between farmgate and final market.  Much of this effect would be controlled for by the state fixed effects.  
For some crops that sold in local markets, like corn and hay, the local prices might have risen more than at 
the national level with the reduction in output as long as they stayed within a price range set by 
transportation costs to other markets (Fox, Fishback, Rhode, 2011).  This localized rise would show up in 
the measure of state personal income but the effect of the rise in limiting purchasing power would not 
because we have not adjusted for localized differences in the cost of living.  Here again the multiplier effect 
will be slightly overstated.   Fishback and Kachanovskaya  32
Federal grants had differential effects on various economic measures that are 
aggregated into per capita personal income.  Table IV shows dollar-for-dollar IV 
estimates for retail sales per capita, wage and salary income per capita and manufacturing 
payrolls per capita.  Data for retail sales per capita and manufacturing payrolls per capita 
data were reported for only some years; therefore, the table includes estimates for per 
capita personal income for the same years to make comparisons on the same set of 
observations.  Dollar-for-dollar estimates cannot be developed when the dependent 
variables are employment and durable good consumption in the form of automobile 
registrations, so we report the effects as elasticities evaluated at the mean of the sample 
along with elasticities for per capita state income. 
The estimates suggest that the distribution of government funds had strong effects 
on consumption but virtually no effect or even a negative effect on employment.  The 
dollar-for-dollar coefficient in the retail sales per capita analysis for the four years in 
which it was available is in the 0.8 to 0.9 range.  The coefficient is similar to the 
coefficient in the per capita personal income estimation for the same four years.  Given 
that the ratio of retail sales to income during this period was roughly 0.5, it appears that 
the grants had a relatively much stronger effect on retail consumption than it did on 
income per capita.   
The grants also contributed to increases in automobile purchases.  The estimates 
of the elasticity of automobile registrations with respect to grants range from 0.047 to 
0.081 while the elasticity estimates for personal income with respect to grants range from 
0.086 to 0.108.   To put this in dollar terms, value each car at the price of a new Ford in 
1934, which was about $500 then and $1,247 when adjusted to the 1967 Consumer Price Fishback and Kachanovskaya  33
Index values used to control for the price level.  An additional dollar of federal spending 
raised the value of car registrations by between 10 and 22 cents. 
The effect of grants on wage and salary income was small relative to the effect on 
all personal income. The dollar-for-dollar coefficients for wage and salary income are 
relatively low, ranging from 0.09 to 0.66.   These are much smaller than the coefficients 
above 1 for personal income.  Wage and salary income accounts for roughly 60 percent 
of all income during this period, and the wage and salary grant coefficients are less than 
60 percent of the coefficients for personal income. 
In contrast to their generally strong positive effects on personal income and 
consumption, the effects of grants on per capita employment and manufacturing payrolls 
are mostly negative and relatively small in size.29  30  These findings for private 
employment and payrolls are in the same range as the results for the impact of New Deal 
relief spending found by Neumann, Fishback, and Kantor (2010) for a city-level monthly 
panel from 1932 through 1939 and Benjamin and Mathews’ (1992) findings for a state 
panel from 1932-1939.  Both find that relief spending was associated with crowding out 
of private employment after 1935.  Neumann, Fishback, and Kantor found some positive 
effects of relief spending on employment from 1932 to 1935, while Benjamin and 
Mathews find crowding out of about 20 percent.  Wallis and Benjamin (1982) also 
                                                 
29We put all measures on a per capita basis for consistency.  We have also estimated the models 
for the payrolls and employment without putting them on a per capita basis and the magnitudes of the 
results are only slightly larger. 
30It is possible that the statistically insignificant effect of government spending on manufacturing 
payrolls might reflect the fact that most manufacturing was selling to national and international markets.  If 
so, a rise in federal spending within a state would only stimulate the demand in that state, which might be a 
small share of the demand for the product. We checked this hypothesis by estimating the impact of 
spending on manufacturing payrolls in the bread industry for the years 1929, 1931, 1933, 1935, and 1937.  
The bread industry was found in every state and tended to sell locally.  The bread industry results also show 
small and statistically insignificant effects of federal spending.  The dollar-for-dollar effects 0.2 cents per 
dollar spent, while the elasticities are smaller than the elasticities reported for manufacturing payrolls per 
capita in Table IV.  The findings for the bread industry are therefore inconsistent with the idea that the 
small effects on manufacturing are being driven by the dispersed nature of manufacturing consumption. Fishback and Kachanovskaya  34
provide cross-sectional estimates that cast doubt on any positive effects of New Deal 
spending on private employment.  
 
State by State Estimates 
The identification in the state and year fixed effects IV model comes from 
changes over time within the same state in the part of federal spending correlated with the 
instrument after controlling for nation-wide shocks in each year.  The coefficient is 
therefore an average across the states.  We also estimate the relationship for each 
individual state over the period using a difference model to reduce problems with non-
stationarity. The major issue with the state-by-state estimation is how well the model can 
control for national shocks common to all states.  Our solution is to include the difference 
in the real per capita national money supply (M2) and a dummy variable for the National 
Recovery Administration (NRA) period from 1933 through 1935.  Cole and Ohanian 
(2004) argue that the NRA’s codes of competition held wages and prices high and 
contributed greatly to the underemployment of resources.  On the other hand, Eggertsson 
(2008) argues that the NRA push for high prices and wage stimulated the economy as 
part of a program to reverse inflationary expectations.  Changes in tax rates were 
important but there were multiple changes over the period and there are few degrees of 
freedom.  To capture the impact of taxes we estimate the model with grants net of federal 
taxes in each state.  Results are reported for estimates without the taxes for comparison 
purposes.  In this analysis we use the moat/swing instrument, which has fewer problems 
with weak instrument bias than when total grants spending is used.   Fishback and Kachanovskaya  35
Table V shows the dollar-for-dollar effects on per capita state personal income of 
a one dollar increase in per capita grants net of federal taxes in each state.  For 
comparison, when the model specification is estimated for the panel of all states, the 
multiplier coefficient is 0.605 with a t-statistic of 3.19 and the instrument strength tests 
suggest that it is strong.  The instrument strength varies for each state.  There were 33 
states where the hypothesis of weak instrument bias of 10 percent was rejected, 7 more 
estimates that met the 15 percent or less criteria, and 8 with very weak instruments.  The 
estimates were generally consistent with a view of negative endogeneity, as the IV 
multiplier estimates were more positive, by an average of about .25, than the OLS 
coefficients in 35 of the 40 states where weak instrument bias is not a problem.    The 
average dollar-for-dollar coefficient for those states was 0.80.   For the 40 states with no 
more than 15 percent weak instrument bias, the average coefficient was .79 and the 
values ranged from -1.27 in Kansas to 3.4 in Idaho.  The multiplier estimates for states 
that where weak instrument bias could not be rejected included 5 of the 7 largest values 
in absolute value. 
There was not much of a discernable pattern in the estimates across states.  
Among the states with less than 15 percent weak instrument bias, the extreme values over 
2 were found in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Idaho.  Pennsylvania was probably the 
most self-sufficient state but Idaho was one of the smallest states.  States with values 
between one and two included states of all sizes from several regions. Some had large 
populations, like New York, Massachusetts, and California, but most were in the bottom 
half of the population distribution, including West Virginia, Oregon, Utah, Mississippi, Fishback and Kachanovskaya  36
Washington, Maine, and Florida.  Negative multipliers were found in Kentucky, 
Oklahoma, Minnesota, and Kansas. 
    
Conclusions 
If there was any time to expect a large peace-time multiplier from federal 
spending in the states, it would have been during the period from 1930 through 1940.  
Interest rates were at or near the zero bound for nearly the entire decade, a situation in 
which macroeconomic models predict stronger fiscal multiplier effects.  Unemployment 
rates with work relief workers treated as unemployed were never below 14 percent during 
the decade.  Even if people on work relief were treated as employed, the unemployment 
rate never fell below 9 percent (Darby 1976).  There was idle capital in nearly every 
industry.  As a result, there were clearly a large number of underemployed resources that 
could have been soaked up by federal spending without crowding out private activity.    
Estimates controlling for weather shocks, state and year fixed effects, and in some 
cases state-specific time trend but without using instruments imply that state fiscal 
multipliers were in the 0.1 to 0.5 range.  Given that New Deal funds were distributed in 
part in response to drops in economic activity, there is ample reason to believe that the 
non-IV multiplier estimates are biased downward even in models with state and year 
fixed effects and time trends.  The estimates for the state multipliers that we think are 
most accurate are the IV estimates controlling for state and year fixed effects.  The IV 
estimates without controls for state and year effects are likely too high because they do 
not control for nationwide monetary and tax rate shocks, nor do they control for Fishback and Kachanovskaya  37
fundamental time-invariant features of the states.  The addition of state-specific time 
trends leads to weak instrument bias.  
The dollar-for-dollar multiplier estimates show the dollar change in the measure 
of economic activity in response to a one dollar increase in the measure of government 
spending.  Nearly all of the state per capita personal income multiplier estimates are not 
statistically significantly different from one.  In some estimating strategies, the point 
estimates of the multipliers for nonfarm grant spending and nontransfer grants are as high 
as 1.79 and 2.18, but other estimates are below one for the same measure, and the 
standard errors of the estimates in all of those cases are high enough that a multiplier of 
one cannot be rejected.  Three of four point estimates for coefficients on AAA grants to 
farmers to take land out of production were negative but not statistically significant.  As a 
general statement, the distribution of a dollar of federal funds to a state led to about a 
dollar increase in personal income in the state.   
Federal grants had a stronger impact on consumption than on personal income.  
The per capita retail sales multiplier was roughly the same size as the personal income 
multiplier in the same sample even though retail sales are typically only about 50 percent 
of income.  An additional dollar in federal grants contributed to an increase of about 10 to 
20 cents in the value of automobiles registered in the state. 
On the other hand, there were no signs that increased government grants raised 
nonfarm private employment or manufacturing employment.  Most of the coefficient 
estimates were negative with small elasticities.  The results are consistent with the 
findings by Neumann, Fishback, and Kantor (2010) and Benjamin and Mathews (1992) 
using alternative data sets.     Fishback and Kachanovskaya  38
If we apply the lessons of the New Deal to the federal fiscal stimulus today, it is 
important to realize that the estimates for the states are not for a national multiplier.  
Instead, they describe the impact within the state of additional federal funding in the state 
after all leakages are considered.31   In both periods interest rates are near the zero bound 
and unemployment rates are well above long run averages, although the problems of the 
Depression were far worse.  The New Deal results suggest that federal fiscal stimulus 
during a modern recession would stimulate income in the states roughly dollar-for-dollar 
but have little impact on private nonfarm employment in the state. 
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Total and Per Capita Federal Spending by Program in Millions of Contemporay 
Dollars for the period July 1, 1932 through June 30, 1939  
 


















TOTAL TAXES COLLECTED 
FROM STATES 
 26,061 213.11      
NONREPAYABLE GRANTS             
Works Progress Administration  WPA  6,844 55.97 Work Relief  1936  
Veterans' Administration  VA  3,955 32.34 Relief  Pre 1933   
Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration 





AAA 2,863 23.41 Agriculture 1934  
Civilian Conservation Corps  CCCG  2,130 17.42 Work Relief  1934  
Public Roads Administration  PRA  1,613 13.19 Public Works  Pre 1933   
Rivers and Harbors and Flood Control  RHFC  1,316 10.76 Public Works  Pre 1933   
Public Works Administration--
Nonfederal Projects 
PWANF 1,032 8.44 Public  Works  1934  
Civil Works Administration  CWA  807 6.60 Relief/Public 
Works 
1934 Mar-34
Social Security Act  SSA  759 6.21 Relief  1936  
Public Works Administration--Federal 
Projects 
PWAF 632 5.16 Public  Works  1934  
Balance from Relief Acts  BRA  376 3.08 Relief  1936  
Public Buildings Administration  PBA  324 2.65 Public Works  Pre 1933   
Bureau of Reclamation  BR  290 2.37 Public Works  1934  
Farm Security Administration  FSA  273 2.24 Agriculture  1936  
National Guard  NG  219 1.79 Military  Pre 1933   
Public Works Administration--
Housing Projects 
PWAH 129 1.05 Public  Works  1935  
Soil Conservation Service  SCS  100 0.82 Agriculture  1934  
Agricultural Extension Work  AE  94 0.77 Agriculture  Pre 1933   
Vocational Education  VE  90 0.74 Education  Pre 1933   
U.S. Employment Service  USES  80 0.65 Relief  1934  
Indian Service - Civilian Conservation 
Corps 
CCCIS 51 0.42 Relief  1934  Fishback and Kachanovskaya  51
Agricultural Experiment Stations  AEX  36 0.29 Agriculture  Pre 1933   
Forest Service (Roads)  FSR  34 0.28 Public Works  1937  
Colleges of Agriculture and 
Mechanical Arts 
CAM 24 0.19 Education  Pre  1933   
Forest Funds  FF  17 0.14 Public Works  Pre 1933   
Mineral Lease Act Payments  ML  11 0.09 Public Works  Pre 1933   
Land Utilization Program  LUP  11 0.09 Public Works  1939  
State Soldiers' and Sailors' Homes  SSS  4 0.03 Relief  Pre 1933   
Special Funds  SF  2 0.02 Miscellaneous Pre 1933   
Office of Education--Emergency 
Relief Act Funds 
OE 2 0.02 Education  1936  
State Marine Schools  SMS  1 0.01 Education  Pre 1933   
Books for the Blind  BFB  a)  0.00 Education  Pre 1933   
Federal Water Project Payments  FWP  a)  0.00 Public Works  Pre 1933   
Nonrepayable Grants Total     27,180 222.26      
REPAYABLE LOANS CLOSED             
Reconstruction Finance Corporation RFC  4,782 39.11 All  1932  
Farm Credit Administration  FCA  3,957 32.35 Agriculture  Pre 1933   
Home Owners' Loan Corporation  HOLC  3,158 25.83 Home 
Finance 
1934 1936
Commodity Credit Corporation  CCCL  1,186 9.70 Agriculture  1934  
Public Works Administration  PWAL  508 4.15 Public Works  1934  
Farm Security Administration  FSAL  337 2.76 Agriculture  1934  
Home Owners' Loan Corporation and 
Treasury Investments in Bldg. and 
Savings and Loans Associations 
HOLCT 266 2.17 Home 
Finance 
1934  
Federal Reserve Banks.  FRB  125 1.02 Finance  1935  
Rural Electrification Administration  REA  123 1.01 Agriculture  1936  
U.S. Housing Authority  USHA  56 0.45 Public Works  1939  
Farm Tenant Purchases   FTP  33 0.27 Agriculture  1938  
Disaster Loan Corporation  DLC  17 0.14 Relief  1937  
Total Repayable    14,549 118.97      
Value of Loans Insured by Federal 
Housing Administration 
  00 . 0 0     
Title I --Refurbishing and 
Maintanence Loans 
  834 6.82 Home 
Finance 
1936  
Title II--Home Mortgages.    1,855 15.17 Home 
Finance 
1936  
Total Housing Loans Insured    2,689 21.99     
            
aUnder 500,000 dollars. 
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Table II 
Estimates of Dollar-for-Dollar Effect of Per Capita Grants on State Per Capita 
Personal Income, 1930-1940 
t-statistics Listed Below Coefficients 
 
   Estimation  Specification 
Level/Difference   Level Difference  Growth 
Rate 
Level 
LEAST SQUARES           
No controls  Coeff.  1.04    1.04
t-stat. 2.70     2.70 
Controls state effects  Coeff.  1.43 1.00 1.21 1.43
t-stat. 7.24  7.22  9.17  7.24 
Controls state effects 
and weather 
Coeff.  1.56 1.09 1.33 1.56
t-stat. 7.10  6.95  9.56  7.10 
Controls year effects, 
state effects, and 
weather 
Coeff.  0.45 0.73 1.18 0.45
t-stat. 2.29  3.40  5.61  2.29 
Controls state time 
trends, year effects, 
state effects, and 
weather 
Coeff.  0.16 0.75 1.23 0.16
t-stat. 0.69  3.07  5.18  0.69 
TWO-STAGE LEAST 
SQUARES  
        
   Instrument  Choice 




Controls Weather and 
state Effects 
Coeff.  1.94 1.28 1.29 2.16
t-stat. 15.28  7.23  11.10  15.41 
Instrument 
F-stat. 
198.67 189.66  71.86 192.72 
Controls year effects, 
state effects and 
weather 
Coeff.  1.11 1.10 1.13 1.39
t-stat. 6.14  2.30  3.16  3.44 
Instrument 
F-stat.  13.07 8.15 8.59 7.09 
Controls state time 
trends, year effects, 
state effects, and 
weather 
Coeff.  0.50 1.12 1.14 0.97
t-stat. 2.41  2.33  3.38  1.80 
Instrument 
F-stat. 
5.03 6.94 7.49 4.14 
 
Sources:  See Data Appendix. 
 Notes:   This is a balanced panel with information for 48 states for each year from 1930 
through 1940.  Estimation used the STATA 10 reg and ivreg2 programs.  For the 
calculations of t-statistics, standard errors are based on White corrections using the 
robust command with standard errors clustered at the state level.  The instrument F-Fishback and Kachanovskaya  53
statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald (KP) F statistic.  When compared with 
the Stock-Yogo critical values, the Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald (KP) F statistic can 
be used to test for weak-instrument bias based on the maximum weak-instrument 
bias that one is willing to accept.  In the analyses with one instrument for one 
government activity measure, the critical value is 16.38 at the 10 percent confidence 
level if someone is unwilling to accept more than 10-percent weak instrument bias, 
8.96 for unwillingness to accept more than 15 percent bias and 6.66 for 20 percent 
bias.  When using three instruments the critical values for maximal size of weak 
instrument bias are 22.30 at the 10 percent level if someone is unwilling to accept 
more than 10-percent weak instrument bias, 12.83 for unwillingness to accept more 
than 15 percent bias, 9.54 for 20 percent bias, and 7.80 for 25-percent bias.  The 
critical values for willingness to accept 10-percent weak instrument bias relative to 
the bias from OLS estimation is 9.08 and for willingness to accept 20% bias is 6.46. 
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 Table III 
Estimates of Dollar-for-Dollar Effect of Per Capita Measures of Government 
Funding on State Per Capita Personal Income, 1930-1940 
t-statistics Listed Below Coefficients 
 










    Controls Weather, State and Year Effects 
Grants only  Coeff.  1.11 1.10 1.13 1.39
t-stat.  6.14 2.30 3.16 3.44 
Instrument F-
stat. 
13.07 8.15 8.59 7.09 
Grants plus all 
loans 
Coeff.  0.89 1.54 1.93 0.86
t-stat.  5.54 2.20 2.78 1.98 
Instrument F-
stat. 
16.38 6.46 4.48 9.41 
Grants Plus 10 
% of Loans 
Coeff.  1.05 1.14 1.20 1.08
t-stat.  5.19 1.91 3.13 1.94 
Instrument F-
stat. 
12.74 7.97 8.58 7.85 
Grants Minus 
Taxes 
Coeff.  0.93 1.06 1.14 1.08
t-stat.  3.59 1.99 3.04 1.49 
Instrument F-
stat. 
12.01 7.52 8.46 5.55 
Grants Minus 
Transfers 
Coeff.  1.67 0.38 1.46 2.18
t-stat.  4.14 0.52 3.64 1.97 
Instrument F-
stat. 
12.45 9.86  12.56 6.86 
Grants minus 
AAA 
Coeff.  0.94 1.26 1.42 1.79
t-stat.  3.00 2.13 2.08 2.70 
Instrument F-
stat. 
11.88 7.36 7.42 4.44 
AAA Coeff.  3.68 -2.17 -0.84 -0.41
t-stat.  2.19 -0.74 -0.32 -0.62 
Instrument F-
stat. 
17.58 12.07 11.91 10.28 
  combined F-
stat. 
15.68 7.34 3.06 4.27 Fishback and Kachanovskaya  55
 
    Controls Weather, State and Year Fixed Effects, and 
State-Specific Time Trends 
Grants only  Coeff.  0.50 1.12 1.14 0.97
t-stat.  2.41 2.33 3.38 1.80 
Instrument F-
stat. 
5.03 6.94 7.49 4.14 
Grants plus all 
loans 
Coeff.  0.77 1.72 2.20 0.86
t-stat.  2.94 2.16 2.72 1.26 
Instrument F-
stat. 
11.72 4.04 3.44 7.73 
Grants Plus 10 
% of Loans 
Coeff.  0.65 1.19 1.22 1.08
t-stat.  2.30 1.83 2.86 1.23 
Instrument F-
stat. 
6.28 6.40 7.38 4.04 
grants minus 
taxes 
Coeff.  0.47 1.08 1.13 1.21
t-stat.  2.17 1.95 2.99 1.37 
Instrument F-
stat. 
4.76 6.42 7.98 2.06 
Grants minus 
AAA 
Coeff.  0.51 1.30 1.54 1.73
t-stat.  2.32 2.01 1.73 1.98 
Instrument F-
stat. 
4.49 6.11 6.60 1.87 
AAA Coeff.  2.95 -2.08 -1.47 -3.52
t-stat.  1.44 -0.63 -0.39 -1.39 
Instrument F-
stat. 
10.39 9.17 8.86 4.29 
  combined F-
stat. 
7.71 5.24 1.85 2.06 
Grants minus 
AAA 
Coeff.  0.52 1.35 1.34 1.73
t-stat.  2.20 2.21 2.42 1.98 
Instrument F-
stat. 
    
AAA Coeff.  -0.73 -3.89 -2.93 -3.52
t-stat.  -0.75 -2.75 -1.76 -1.39 
Instrument F-
stat. 
    
  combined F-
stat. 
6.62 20.45  8.45  2.06 
 
All analyses are from individual regressions except for the nonAAA and AAA results, 
which are estimated in the same regression.  The instrument F-statistic is  the 
Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald (KP) F statistic.  See notes to Table II for instrument 
strength critical values with one variable that requires instruments.  In the analysis 
with nonAAA and AAA grants the critical values with 10 percent confidence are 
7.03 for 10 percent bias, 4.58 for 15 percent bias, and 3.95 for 20 percent bias. 
  When loans are included the panel drops 1940 due to problems in obtaining data for 
loans in 1930.  The measures of economic activity are on a calendar year basis Fishback and Kachanovskaya  56
while the measures of government activity are on the July t-1 to June t fiscal year 
basis.  Commodity Credit Corporation loans were dropped from the loan figures 
due to inaccurate measurement of the distribution of loans across states.   Fishback and Kachanovskaya  57
 
Table IV 
Estimates of Impact of Government Grants on Measures of Economic Activity 





Interaction of National 
with 3 Region Dummies 
Moat times 
Swing 
Per Capita State 
Income 
Coeff.  1.11 1.10 1.39 
t-stat. 6.14  2.30  3.44 
Instrument F-
stat. 13.07  8.15  7.09 
Per Capita Wage 
and Salary Income 
Coeff.  0.27 0.09 0.66 
t-stat. 2.01  0.56  1.59 
Instrument F-
stat.  13.07 8.15  7.09 
retail sales per 
capita, 1929, 1933, 
1935, 1939 
Coeff.  0.822   0.884 
t-stat. 1.62    2.05 
Instrument F-
stat.  6.13 
 
4.36 
Income per capita, 
1929, 1933, 1935, 
1939 
Coeff.  0.853   0.941 
t-stat. 3.73    1.83 
Instrument F-




payroll per capita 
29,31,33,35,37,39 
Coeff.  -0.21   -0.01 






Income per capita 
29,31,33,35,37,39 
Coeff.  0.89   1.05 
t-stat. 4.39    2.37 
Instrument F-
stat.  9.91 
 
6.84 
ELASTICITIES   
Per Capita State 
Income 
Coeff.  0.086 0.086 0.108 
t-stat. 6.14  2.3  3.44 
Instrument F-




Coeff.  -0.019 0.001 -0.013 
t-stat. -1.41  0.06  -0.47 
Instrument F-
stat. 
13.07 8.15  7.09 
Manufacturing 
employment per 
Coeff.  -0.082 -0.003 -0.066 





13.07 7.09  7.09 
Auto Registrations 
Per Capita 
Coeff.  0.075 0.047 0.081 
t-stat. 3.81  2.08  2.38 
Instrument F-
stat. 
13.07 8.15  7.09 Fishback and Kachanovskaya  59
  
Table V 
Dollar-for-Dollar Estimates by State from Differenced Regressions  













Rejects 10-percent Weak Instrument Bias at the 10-percent Level 
New Jersey  0.95  0.83 2.21 2.85 19.32 
Pennsylvania 0.78  0.62 2.06 2.62 41.24 
West Virginia  1.26  1.66 1.80 6.13 28.82 
Oregon 1.40  2.48 1.59 4.58 26.02 
Utah 0.96  1.10 1.26 2.20 79.67 
Massachusetts 0.54  1.48 1.22 1.88 30.50 
Mississippi 0.97  2.11 1.07 2.98 37.68 
Washington 0.84  1.15 1.06 2.28 68.63 
California 0.85  1.04 1.03 1.76 21.15 
North Carolina  0.62  0.85 0.86 1.93 22.05 
Vermont 0.66  1.62 0.78 2.91 83.26 
Colorado 0.79  1.61 0.76 1.98 81.61 
Tennessee 0.47  0.57 0.73 1.69 41.54 
New 
Hampshire 0.63  1 0.70 2.1 61.47 
Arkansas 0.59  1.39 0.70 2.2 25.75 
Ohio 0.47  0.45 0.66 0.77 25.94 
New Mexico  0.51  1.10 0.64 2.27 44.83 
Rhode Island  1.29  1.94 0.61 1.18 259.36 
Alabama 0.56  1 0.61 1.55 44.83 
Connecticut 0.57  0.5 0.61 3.19 144.60 
Louisiana 0.47  0.97 0.58 1.36 31.52 
Indiana 0.33  0.24 0.57 0.61 68.43 
Wyoming 0.23  0.28 0.52 0.75 19.37 
Georgia 0.48  1.33 0.51 1.98 67.28 
Illinois 0.16  0.12 0.49 0.44 23.97 
Wisconsin 0.26  0.27 0.37 0.5 118.42 
South Carolina  0.55  1.84 0.37 1.67 70.08 
Missouri -0.06  -0.07 0.32 0.52 36.11 
Virginia 0.00  0 0.12 0.26 62.49 
Kentucky -0.82  -0.12 -0.03 -0.06 35.22 
Oklahoma -0.14  -0.19 -0.09 -0.15 58.38 
Minnesota -0.82  -0.81 -0.50 -0.65 28.48 
Kansas -0.92  -1.03 -1.27 -1.32 25.50 
Rejects 20-percent Weak-Instrument Bias at 10 percent Level 
Idaho 4.02  4.26 3.46 4.26 10.20 
New York  0.34  0.47 1.50 1.51 9.33 
Maine 0.84  1.08 1.29 1.69 15.30 Fishback and Kachanovskaya  60
Florida 0.83  0.92 1.19 1.24 11.06 
Texas 0.10  0.13 0.67 0.79 10.49 
Maryland 0.08  0.14 0.50 1.20 10.53 
Arizona 0.01  0.00 0.28 1.07 14.81 
Cannot Reject 20-percent Weak-Instrument Bias at 10 percent level. 
South Dakota  3.42  3.24 17.54 0.82 0.26 
Nevada 0.54  1.35 3.51 1.15 0.73 
Delaware 0.63  1.05 1.29 1.18 1.58 
Michigan -1.11  -1.68 1.09 0.62 3.30 
Montana 1.14  1.65 -0.52 -0.68 5.97 
Nebraska 0.40  0.26 -6.32 -1.53 2.94 
Iowa -3.76  -1.15 -8.30 -2.85 3.94 
North Dakota  2.81  2.08 -24.79 -0.34 0.08 
 
 
Notes.  The estimates come from difference regressions of the change in real per capita 
personal income on the change in real per capita federal grants minus taxes, the change in 
the real money supply, a dummy for the NRA period, and a year trend.  The estimates 
cover the period 1930 through 1940 for each state.  Fishback and Kachanovskaya  61
Figure I 
Annual Changes in Per Capita New Deal Grants and Changes in Per Capita Personal 
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DATA APPENDIX 
IN SEARCH OF THE MULTIPLIER FOR FEDERAL SPENDING IN THE 
STATES DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
 
State Personal Income 
  There are different concepts of government spending used in the literature and in 
national income accounting.  Many macroeconomic models refer to government 
purchases of goods and services when examining real GDP estimates.  They exclude 
transfer payments.  
In the analysis in this paper the state personal income and state populations are 
from the current BEA website. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Regional Economic Information System,  
http://www.bea.gov/regional/spi/SA1-3fn.cfm.    The definitions reported there are very 
similar to the original BEA estimates from the late 1930s and early 1940s from Creamer 
and Merwin (1941).  Their definition of personal income is based on the definitions used 
for monthly personal income described in Cone, 1940.  The focus was on consumer 
purchasing power “Consumer purchasing power” signifies the ability of consumers to 
purchase the new goods and services currently produced by business enterprises.     
The definition of income payments is National Income after subtracting business 
savings, social security contributions from employer and employee, contributions to the 
Railroad Retirement Fund and contributions to retirement systems for government 
employees and then adding direct relief, federal pensions to veterans, World War I 
Adjusted Service Compensation (ASC) benefits in the form of loans or cash payouts, 
other government retirement allowances, unemployment compensation, railroad 
insurance benefits and old-age insurance benefits.   Agriculture benefit payments are 
included in income (Cone 1940, pp. 3, 4, 8, 10, 13, 39).   
In addition, the following items were excluded from state personal income:  
capital gains; earnings from odd jobs due to lack of data; Illegal earnings because they 
have “no economic value within the legal framework of the producing economy;” and 
imputed income from ownership of durable consumers’ goods is excluded.   
  Cone (1940, p. 8) explained the logic for incorporating the World War I ASC 
loans and payouts in the following way: 
   
“Prior to June 1936 payments to World War veterans took the form of 
cash loans on the security of their adjusted service certificates; in that 
month the Federal Government, in discharge of its obligations on amount 
of adjusted service legislation, remitted to the veterans more than 
$2,000,000,000 worth of adjusted service bonds and some cash.  The 
larger portion of these bonds were liquidated during the year 1936, but the 
Treasury has been redeeming them in smaller amounts during the past 3 
years; the present rate is about $2,000,000 a month.  More properly , then, 
the payments to veterans represent in the first instance loans on existing 
assets and in the second the gradual liquidation of these assets rather than 
the actual payment of income as here defined.  Nevertheless, because 
these disbursements of the Federal Government were in the nature of 
original receipts to the veterans and because, owing to the large volume of Fishback and Kachanovskaya  63
the disbursements and their wide distribution among 3,000,000 veterans, 
they represented an important stimuls to consumption on two distinct 
occasions, they have been incorporated into the monthly series. 
 
  Since the personal income payments include transfers, transfers have been 
incorporated in the federal government distribution of grants (Cone 1940, p. 8, 39). 
 
Other Measures of Economic Activity 
  State wage and salary income is from Creamer and Merwin (1942).  Cone (1940) 
provides an overview of the series used to construct the data.  Manufacturing Payrolls for 
1929, 1931, 1933, 1935, 1937, and 1939 are from the Biennial U.S. Manufacturing 
Censuses of 1931, 1933, 1935, 1937, and from the Manufacturing Volumes in the 
Fifteenth and Sixteenth Censuses of the United States and Haines (ICPSR 2896).  Retail 
Sales data are from retail censuses conducted by the Bureau of the Census and reported in 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 1936 and 
1939.  The 1929 and 1939 retail sales are from Haines (ICPSR 2896).    
Wallis (1989) constructed the index for the broad measure of employment, which 
covers establishments in manufacturing, mining, retail, wholesale, laundries, and street 
railroads, and does not include railroads, construction, or government workers.  The 
index is built up from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics monthly establishment surveys 
collected by various agencies around the country.  Wallis then benchmarked the series to 
census employment figures.  The index of payrolls for the broad measure of employment 
is constructed from the same information and is built up from the Monthly Labor Review 
and a series of monthly reports Employment and Payrolls.  We have not benchmarked the 
payroll indices.  In the payroll index we substituted information from Milwaukee from 
the Neumann, Fishback, and Kantor (2010) dataset for information for Wisconsin 
because the Wisconsin series led to extremely unusual figures.  Wallis (1989) also 
mentions this issue).  We have also created the unbenchmarked employment index from 
this data and have used it to create an estimate of average monthly earnings.   
Automobile registrations for each state were collected from  U.S. Public Roads 
Administration (1947).   
 
Measuring Government Spending 
 
We have compiled a data set of the key components of federal spending and loans 
identified by the U.S. Office of Government Reports (OGR) between 1933 and 1939.  
Starting with the OGR data we then checked the spending in each category from 1933 
and 1939 and then extended the data forward to 1940 and backward to 1930 using reports 
of the U.S. Treasury and many federal agencies.   
 
The Path of Federal Spending in the States through 1932 
  Prior to the New Deal there were relatively few federal programs that distributed 
grants and loans to the states, local governments, or individuals within states.  By the 
early 1920s the grants came in the form of federal highway grants to the states through 
the Department of Agriculture, public health grants for children under the Shephard-
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to state agricultural and mechanical universities, for books for the blind, marine schools, 
and vocational education; grants under the Department of Agriculture to Experiment 
Stations and Extension Services.  The Army Corps of Engineers was building, improving, 
and maintaining rivers and harbors and flood control works.  The Veterans’ Bureau was 
paying out pension and death payments to veterans or their dependents.  There were also 
payments to replace lost property taxes to counties in Oregon associated with the Coos 
Bay wagon trail and to the state of Oregon for the loss of property taxes on land that the 
federal government had taken back over from the original Oregon and California 
Railroad land grant.  Finally, there were payments to Oklahoma for gas and oil royalties.   
The Shephard-Townsend grants wound down after 1930. 
  The Veterans’ Bureau provided extensive vocational rehabilitation training for 
disabled veterans from World War I with expenditures peaking $166 million in 1922 
before slowly declining over the decade to $20 thousand in 1930.  The Bureau also 
provided pensions to veterans, payments to widows of veterans, various forms of 
insurance, and hospital and medical services.   
The Bureau of Reclamation was providing no interest loans for building dams and 
irrigation works and Boulder Dam had begun construction.  In the paper we treated these 
as grant expenditures because the payments on the loans were often delayed for long 
periods of time and in a number of cases were forgiven.     
The loans came in the form of Federal Land Bank mortgage loans to farmers and 
a series of special appropriations for emergency crop and feed loans.  After 1926 loans 
were available to veterans based on collateral in the form of World War I Adjusted 
Service Certificates (ASCs) that would mature after 20 years from the date of receipt of 
the ASC.      
  Between the fiscal years 1929 and 1933 Congress and the Hoover Administration 
raised federal government outlays by 52 percent in nominal terms and 88 percent after 
adjusting for inflation.  Mostly this came in the form of expansions of existing programs.  
In February 1932 the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was established and made a 
broad range of loans to financial institutions, industry, and lower levels of government.   
Franklin Roosevelt and the Democratic Congress took office in early March, 1933 and 
introduced the broad range of programs seen in Table 1 of the paper.  The Public Roads 
Administration took over the highway grants formerly distributed by the USDA and the 
Federal Credit Administration   
 
Veterans’ Bonus. 
The World War I Veterans’ Bonus that was associated with the Bonus Army 
March of 1931 and the cash payout in 1936 was based on an insurance certificate that 
would mature in the mid 1940s.  Through 1936 World War I veterans could obtain loans 
against the certificates, which they did quite actively.  In 1936 over Roosevelt’s veto 
Congress passed a law that allowed cash payments on the certificates and thus a very 
large cash payout.   
On May 19
th, 1924, Congress enacted a law providing for adjusted service 
compensation for veterans of World War I.  The act provided for a basic service credit of 
$1 per day served and a $1.25 for each day served overseas with a maximum credit of 
$625 for overseas service and $500 for home service.  For veterans with credits less than 
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insurance certificate of the amount multiplied by 1.25 that would pay out the amount on 
the certificate at the end of 20 years.  Apparently, the 25 percent increase was added to 
take into account the delayed nature of the payment.  If the beneficiary died before 20 
years, his beneficiary would receive the amount on the certificate (Veterans Bureau, 
1924, p. 688).   In the original act, the veteran could borrow from banks or trust 
companies using the certificate as collateral an amount up to 90 percent of the present 
value of the certificate at the end of the year in which the loan was made using a discount 
rate of 4 percent and adjusting for likely mortality.  This turned out to be about 40 percent 
of the value of a certificate maturing in 20 years.  If the veteran failed to pay interest and 
the face value, the bank could receive payment from the Veterans’ Bureau to cover the 
loan, and the certificate was passed to the Veterans’ Bureau  (Administrator of Veterans’ 
Affairs, 1924, pp. 688-672; 1932, p. 36).  The interest rate on loans was established as 2 
percent about the Federal rediscount rate for 60 days’ paper in the Federal Reserve 
District where the loan was made.  Many people ignore the life insurance value of the 
certificates that were issued.  The Veteran’s Administration suggested in 1932 that in 80 
percent of the cases of veterans dying, the insurance payout from the ASC was the only 
material asset left to the dependents (Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs, 1932, p. 36-37). 
  Between 1925 and 1936 the Veterans’ Bureau issued roughly 3.7 million 
adjusted-service certificates (ASCs) with maturity value of $3.69 billion.  About $3.1 
billion had been issued in certificates by June 30, 1926, while the rest trickled in over 
time as the deadline for application was consistently extended.   
  On March 3, 1927, Congress authorized the Veterans’ Bureau to loan directly on 
the ASCs.  By 1928, as seen in Table A-1, nearly 700,000 veterans borrowed against 
their ascs.  By 1930 the Veterans’ Bureau had made about 2.4 million loans with a value 
of $215 million against the ASCs.   
On Feb. 27, 1931 Congress passed Public No. 743 over Hoover’s veto.  It 
provided that the loan basis of the asc shall at no time be less than 50 percent of the face 
value of the asc after the certificate has been in effect for 2 years.  The law also capped 
the maximum interest rate at 4.5 percent.  The new law led to an explosion of new loans 
as the cumulative dollar value of loans on certificates rose from $215 million to nearly 
$1.1 billion (Administrator of the Veterans’ Bureau, 1931, pp. 10, 42-43).  The loans had 
a nice feature that the veteran could forgo repayment and just allow the repayment plus 
accumulated interest to be taken out of the payment made when the certificate matured.  
The Veterans’ Bureau estimated this would lead to a payout of about $188 for a a typical 
certificate (the average was roughly $1,000) on which 50 percent had been borrowed and 
no principal and interest repaid.  Of course, the veteran received the intial $500 up front.  
A law of July 21, 1932 eliminated the two-year waiting period between issuance of the 
certificate and the loan and cut the maximum interest rate to 3.5 percent (Administrator 
of the Veterans’ Bureau (1932, pp. 10, 36-38).  After the burst in 1931, the value of loans 
on the certificates rose by roughly $300-350 million in fiscal 1932 and 1933, declined 




Loans on World War I Adjusted-Service Certicates through June 30 of Fiscal Year 




























1927 689,805 64,433,625 689,805 64,433,625 
1928 757,706 73,884,775 67,901 9,451,150 
1929 1,429,946  133,653,488 672,240 59,768,713 
1930 2,357,697  215,435,144 927,751 81,781,656 
1931 2,265,345  1,087,195,525 -92,352 871,760,381  795,000,000
1932 2,584,582  1,396,042,679 319,237 308,847,154  181,000,000
1933 2,836,922  1,750,000,000 252,340 353,957,321  181,000,000
1934 2,884,504  1,614,220,289 47,582 -135,779,711  34,000,000
1935 2,904,525  1,679,669,884 20,021 65,449,595  24,000,000
 
 
Sources:  Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs.  1927, p. 44; 1928, 26-27; 1929, pp. 5, 30; 
1930, pp. 30; 1931, pp. 10, ; 1932, pp. 11, 36-68; 1933, pp. 24-25; 1934, pp. 28-29; 1935, 
pp. 22-23.  Cone, 1940, p. 44. 
  
Frederick Cone (1940, 44) provided monthly estimates of loans on ASCs that he 
included as part of his estimates of personal income.  Table A-1 lists the fiscal year totals 
of loans from 1931 through 1935.  His amounts differ from the ones in the veterans’ 
bureau reports, as he has no loans listed in fiscal year 1930.  When the transition is made 
to grants and the loans paid off in 1936, his totals don’t match the veterans’ bureau totals.  
We used Cone’s estimates for the ASCs to subtract out the ASCs from the personal 
income measures to obtain production income numbers.  His calendar year totals after 
paying off loans in millions for 1936 are 1,427, for 1937 are $120, for 1938 are $58, and 
for 1939 are $34.  He does not report a value for 1940.   In measuring grants and loans, 
we used the information from the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs Reports.   
We have been unable to find descriptions of the amount of the loans on ASCS or 
the value of the veterans’ bonus on the ASCs in 1936 through 1941 by state for each year.  
However, there are several sources for specific years that give good descriptions of the 
share of World War I veterans in the states in several years.   The 1926 report of the 
Veterans’ Bureau Administrator reported the distribution of the ASCs across states 
distributed to that time, but no reports were made after that.   By June 30, 1926 
approximately 84 percent of the certificates had been issued.  The 1930 Census reported 
the number of World War I veterans, and we used the Integrated Public Use Microdata 
Sample for 1930 to get an estimate of the number of World War I veterans in each state.  
We also have information on the number of living World War I veterans receiving 
pensions in 1934 through 1941 Administrator of  Veterans’ Affairs, 1926, pp. 312-313; 
1934, pp. 78-79; 1935, pp. 80-81; 1936, pp. 90-91; 1937; pp. 80-81; 1938, pp. 93-94 ; 
1939, pp. 93-94; 1940, pp. 101-102;  1941, pp. 89-90).  The correlations between the Fishback and Kachanovskaya  67
1934 through 1941 numbers were all above .99.  The correlations between the 1926 
numbers and these numbers were in the 0.93 to 0.94 range, the correlations between the 
1930 number and the 1934-1941 numbers were in the .92 range, which might be expected 
if people were moving around the country.  We calculated the share of veterans in each 
state (taking into account veterans living elsewhere and in Washington, D.C in the total) 
in each year where we had information.  For the years 1927 through 1929 and 1931 
through 1933 we used straight-line interpolations of the shares between the values in 
1926 , 1930, and 1934.  We then multiplied the values by the national totals to get loan 
values for the ASCs in each state in 1927 through 1935 and by the cash payouts in 1936 
through 1941.   
In response to pressure from veterans’ groups, Congress overrode a Roosevelt 
veto on January 27, 1936 to create a new payment structure for the ASCs.   The World 
War I veterans could turn in the ASCs for payment of the face value in cash (the famed 
Veterans’ Bonus) after their outstanding loans and accumulated interest to that date had 
been deducted.  The veteran could also choose a bond dated June 15, 1936 to mature June 
15, 1945 with interest at the rate of 3 percent per annum but no interest to be paid on any 
bond redeemed before June 15, 1937.  As of June 30, 1936, during the life of the 
program, the veterans’ bureau had issued a total 3,757,259 ASCs with a maturity value of 
$3.692 billion.  Of these 231,109 had matured on account of death and $229.5 million 
had been awarded to the designated beneficiaries.  This left 3.52 million certificates in 
force with maturity values of $3.462 billion.  Payments of less than $50 had been made in 
165,184 cases to the value of $5.206 million.  Cash settlements were made to the 
beneficiaries of 135,615 veterans who died in service for an amount of $44.669 million.   
After the passage of the 1936 act, the VA received 3.264 million applications for 
settlements of which 98.9 percent had been certified and the rest were in the process.  The 
face value of the certificates was $3.206 billion.  After deducting outstanding liens for 
loans the net value was $1.764 billion.    
In constructing the data, we used the change in the cumulative value of the 
Veterans’ Bureau’s loans on the ASCs as the value of loans in each fiscal year through 
the end of fiscal year 1935.  Hardly anybody held on to their loans after the passage of 
the cash opportunity in 1936.   The issue arises as to how to treat the cash out of the 
veterans’ bureau.  We treated the full $3.206 billion in cash and bond payouts in fiscal 
year 1936 as a grant, while the value of loans was treated as a repayment with a value of 
minus $1,679,699,884 for that year.  Additional cash disbursements were made of $282.6 
million in fiscal 1937, $13.8 million in 1938, $7.4 million in 1939, $9.2 million in 1940, 
and $2.657 million in 1941 (Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs 1941, p. 87).   
   
 
Tennessee Valley Authority Spending 
 
From examining the OGR figures for spending on rivers and harbors and the 
Bureau of Reclamation in Tennessee and Alabama, it is clear that the Tennessee Valley 
Authority expenditures on the construction of a series of Dams and Canals along the 
Tennessee River are not included.  The TVA was a quasi-government corporation that 
was supposed to repay construction expenditures eventually with electric power revenues 
but these were very slow to repay the full bill.  The expenditures were included in the Fishback and Kachanovskaya  68
Federal Budget expenditure figures listed in the Statistical Abstract of the United States 
in various years, so they likely belong as expenditures.  Another reason to include them is 
that the Office of Government Reports included the Bureau of Reclamation expenditures 
on Dams and irrigation projects in their estimates.   We constructed estimates of the 
expenditures on the TVA project, which started in fiscal year 1934 using information 
from the Federal budget line item for the TVA (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical 
Abstract of the United States,  1935, p. 169, 1936, p. 170, 1937, p. 168, 1938, p. 174, 
1939, p. 172, 1940 p. 198, 1941, p. 184, and 1942, p. 198) and from the TVA annual 
reports.   
We divided up the line item for each year by projects using the TVA Annual 
Reports for the years 1935 through 1942.  The TVA reported a net investment figure for 
each Dam project for the fiscal years 1934, 1935, 1936, and 1937 (Reports of 1935, pp. 
63-68; 1936 123-129; 1937, 103-109).  National defense and fertilizer net investments 
were all assigned to the Muscle Shoals, Alabama area.  Mapping and future project 
expenditures were split evenly between Alabama and Tennessee.  In 1938, the TVA 
began reporting the cumulative cost over the years for each of the following dams:  
Wilson, Norris, and Wheeler Dams.  In 1939, Pickwick was added.   (Reports of 1938, 
pp. 20-26; 1939, 15-22).  In 1940 an evaluation of the fixed assets for Wilson, Norris, 
Wheeler, Pickwick, Hiwassee, Guntersville, and Chickamauga was reported (Report of 
1940, 61-63).  The 1941 Report (pp. 41-43) then reported the cumulative cost again.   
Prior to 1939 the construction costs for Hiwassee, Guntersville, and Chickamauga were 
reported together.  Using information on the amount of construction completed (Reports 
of 1938, pp. 20-26, 1939, 15-22, and 1940, p. 16-18) we could divide up the expenditures 
across the years.  In late 1939 the TVA began reporting aggregate values of constructions 
o the Watts Bar and Kentucky Dam projects.  We split the total expenditures evenly 
between the two projects through 1940 and then used information on the construction 
costs of the projects in 1941 (pp. 41-43) to calculate the differences.  The annual 
estimates of expenditures from these various cumulative measures appear consistent with 
the narrative descriptions of the progress of construction on each project.  In the process 
of developing the figures, a large estimate for Wilson dam in Muscle Shoals, Alabama 
appears for the first time in 1937.  Wilson Dam was built before the 1930s and 
transferred to the TVA when it was started.  A transfer value was not developed until 
1937, and that is when it appears in the records.  To get the final value for each state we 
added up the total annual expenditures for all projects and then calculated the ratio of the 
expenditures from the line item for the TVA in the federal expenditures to the total value 
we calculated.  We then multiplied that ratio by the annual values we estimated in each 
state.  
Table A.2 






1934  General maps and map work  85,641 Alabama 
1935  General maps and map work  332,773 Alabama 
1936  General maps and map work  383,611 Alabama 
1937  General maps and map work  239,268 Alabama Fishback and Kachanovskaya  69
1938  General maps and map work  0 Alabama 
1939  General maps and map work  0 Alabama 
1940  General maps and map work  0 Alabama 
1934 General  Program  94,521 Alabama 
1935 General  Program  227,930 Alabama 
1936 General  Program  387,443 Alabama 
1937 General  Program  302,004 Alabama 
1938 General  Program  0 Alabama 
1939 General  Program  0 Alabama 
1940 General  Program  0 Alabama 
1935  Guntersville Dam and Reservoir  23,927 Alabama 
1936  Guntersville Dam and Reservoir 2,659,358 Alabama 
1937  Guntersville Dam and Reservoir 8,976,602 Alabama 
1938  Guntersville Dam and Reservoir 20,293,793 Alabama 
1939  Guntersville Dam and Reservoir 9,738,410 Alabama 
1940  Guntersville Dam and Reservoir 1,967,208 Alabama 
1934  Other dam projects  0 Alabama 
1935  Other dam projects  34,035 Alabama 
1936  Other Dam projects  350,431 Alabama 
1937  Other Dam projects  325,355 Alabama 
1938  Other Dam projects  0 Alabama 
1939  Other Dam projects  0 Alabama 
1934  Wheeler Dam and Reservoir  2,090,454 Alabama 
1935  Wheeler Dam and Reservoir  13,165,198 Alabama 
1936  Wheeler Dam and Reservoir  12,890,593 Alabama 
1937  Wheeler Dam and Reservoir  3,285,043 Alabama 
1938  Wheeler Dam and Reservoir  626,956 Alabama 
1939  Wheeler Dam and Reservoir  395,905 Alabama 
1940  Wheeler Dam and Reservoir  0 Alabama 
1934  Wilson Dam and Reservoir 2,396,583 Alabama 
1935  Wilson Dam and Reservoir 4,866,477 Alabama 
1936  Wilson Dam and Reservoir 8,237,822 Alabama 
1937  Wilson Dam and Reservoir 3,843,698 Alabama 
1938  Wilson Dam and Reservoir 1,671,786 Alabama 
1939  Wilson Dam and Reservoir 1,055,686 Alabama 
1940  Wilson Dam and Reservoir 1,353,059 Alabama 
1941  Wilson Dam and Reservoir 1,018,167 Alabama 
1941  Wilson fertilizer plant  882,948 Alabama 
1935  Hiwassee Dam and Reservoir 138,856 North  Carolina 
1936  Hiwassee Dam and Reservoir 254,474 North  Carolina 
1937  Hiwassee Dam and Reservoir 2,554,688 North  Carolina 
1938  Hiwassee Dam and Reservoir 2,560,249 North  Carolina 
1939  Hiwassee Dam and Reservoir 4,824,822 North  Carolina 
1940  Hiwassee Dam and Reservoir 5,925,531 North  Carolina 
1939 Kentucky  Gilbertsville  Project 7,469,486 Kentucky 
1940 Kentucky  Gilbertsville  Project 9,573,543 Kentucky Fishback and Kachanovskaya  70
1941 Kentucky  Gilbertsville  Project 18,097,817 Kentucky 
1941 Cherokee  Dam  11,142,725 Tennessee 
1935  Chickamauga Dam and Reservoir  35,831 Tennessee 
1936  Chickamauga Dam and Reservoir 2,250,697 Tennessee 
1937  Chickamauga Dam and Reservoir 7,403,995 Tennessee 
1938  Chickamauga Dam and Reservoir 4,618,291 Tennessee 
1939  Chickamauga Dam and Reservoir 9,853,205 Tennessee 
1940  Chickamauga Dam and Reservoir 7,803,115 Tennessee 
1941 Ft.  Loudon  2,531,536 Tennessee 
1934  General maps and map work  85,641 Tennessee 
1935 General  maps  and  map work  332,773 Tennessee 
1936 General  maps  and  map work  383,611 Tennessee 
1937 General  maps  and  map work  239,268 Tennessee 
1938  General maps and map work  0 Tennessee 
1939  General maps and map work  0 Tennessee 
1940  General maps and map work  0 Tennessee 
1934 General  Program  94,521 Tennessee 
1935 General  Program 227,930 Tennessee 
1936 General  Program 387,443 Tennessee 
1937 General  Program 302,004 Tennessee 
1938 General  Program  0 Tennessee 
1939 General  Program  0 Tennessee 
1940 General  Program  0 Tennessee 
1941 Hales  Bar  549,962 Tennessee 
1934  Norris Dam and Reservoir  6,619,639 Tennessee 
1935  Norris Dam and Reservoir  14,579,302 Tennessee 
1936  Norris Dam and Reservoir  12,349,029 Tennessee 
1937  Norris Dam and Reservoir  3,285,274 Tennessee 
1938  Norris Dam and Reservoir  0 Tennessee 
1939  Norris Dam and Reservoir  0 Tennessee 
1940  Norris Dam and Reservoir  0 Tennessee 
1934  Other dam projects  0 Tennessee 
1935  Other dam projects  34,035 Tennessee 
1936  Other Dam projects  350,431 Tennessee 
1937  Other Dam projects  325,355 Tennessee 
1938  Other Dam projects  0 Tennessee 
1939  Other Dam projects  0 Tennessee 
1934 
Pickwick Landing Dam and 
Reservoir 0 Tennessee 
1935 
Pickwick Landing Dam and 
Reservoir 2,542,933 Tennessee 
1936 
Pickwick Landing Dam and 
Reservoir 7,845,057 Tennessee 
1937 
Pickwick Landing Dam and 
Reservoir 11,251,447 Tennessee 
1938 
Pickwick Landing Dam and 
Reservoir 12,021,925 Tennessee Fishback and Kachanovskaya  71
1939 
Pickwick Landing Dam and 
Reservoir 0 Tennessee 
1940 
Pickwick Landing Dam and 
Reservoir 0 Tennessee 
1941 
Pickwick Landing Dam and 
Reservoir 2,721,983 Tennessee 
1939  Watts Bar Project  7,469,486 Tennessee 
1940  Watts Bar Project  9,573,543 Tennessee 
1941  Watts Bar Project  14,229,862 Tennessee 
 
 
Extending the OGR Expenditures back to Fiscal Year 1930 and forward to Fiscal 
Year 1941. 
 
We were able to extend the federal grant spending by state back to fiscal year 
1930 and forward to fiscal year 1941 using information from the Annual Reports of the 
Treasury Department, which reported direct payments made to states under cooperative 
arrangements and grants to and expenditures within states providing direct relief, work 
relief, and other aid, exclusive of loans (U.S. Department of Treasury, Annual 
Report,1930, 623-626; 1931, 566-569; 1932,443-446; 1933, 382-385 ;  1934, 397-401; 
1935, 432-4351936, 474-477; 1937, 474-479; 1938, 520-531; 1939, pp. 519-525, 1940, 
821-829, 1941, 651-659).   In the fiscal years 1934-1939 when both the OGR and 
Department of Treasury of estimates were both reported, the data by program matched up 
perfectly for the following programs for all years:  Agricultural Experiment Stations, 
Agricultural Extensions works, Colleges of Agricultural and Mechanical Arts, Forest 
Funds, Forest Service Grants, Public Roads Administration (after summing across roads 
programs in Treasury reports), Mineral Lease Payments, Special Funds grants, 
Vocational Education and Rehabilitation Grants, Office of Education Grants, State 
Marine School Grants, Books for Blind Grants, Federal Water Power Grants, Soldier and 
Sailor Homes Grants, and National Guard Grants.  All of these programs were programs 
that existed before, during, and after the New Deal.    
 
Veterans’ Bureau Spending 
 
The Office of Government Reports reported Veterans’ Administration expenditures for 
the years 1933 through 1939 by state.  The loans to living veterans on the World War I 
Adjusted Service Certificates prior to 1936 and the Veterans’ Bonus payouts on the ASCs 
in 1936 and after were not included in the Veterans’ Administration expenditures.  The 
expenditures included pension payouts for Navy and Army veterans, VA homes, 
Maintenance, military and naval insurance payouts for adjusted service certificates of less 
than $50 in cash and payments to dependents from ASCs where the veteran has died,  We 
found that these matched the information reported by the Administrator of Veterans’ 
Affairs in Annual Reports for 1934, pp. 78-83; 1935, pp. 80-85; 1936, pp. 90-95; 1937; 
pp. 80-85; 1938, pp. 93-98 ; 1939, pp. 93-98.  We therefore used information from the 
1940 and 1941 Reports to add the data for those years (1940, pp. 101-106;  1941, pp. 89-
94).  The distributions across states in each year were pretty stable with pair-wise Fishback and Kachanovskaya  72
correlations between one year and the next of .98 or higher throughout the period from 
1933 through 1941.   
For the period prior to 1933 the Veterans’ Administration (VA) reported national 
expenditures but did not report the total spending by state.  However, the VA did report 
“the number of pensioners on the roll and the annual value of said roll”  for war pensions 
in 1931 and 1932 in the Annual Report of the Administrator of Veterans’  Affairs  (1931, 
p.  127; 1932, p. 95).  Prior to 1931 the  information was reported in the annual reports of 
the U.S. Commissioner of Pensions (1920, p. 16; 1921, p. 21; 1922, p. 18; 1923, p. 12; 
1924, p. 19; 1925, p. 14;  1926, p. 15; 1927, p. 14; 1928, p. ???; 1929, p. 15; 1930, p. 14) 
and in the Statistical Abstract of the United States (1919, p. 380).    In 1928 the 
information was reported in the Secretary of Interior, Annual Report, 1928 (p. 292). 
For the years through 1932 the veterans’ administration reports the number of 
pensioners on the rolls and the value of the pensions to be paid by state.  This does not 
represent all of the types of funds for the VA grants used in the data set from 1933 to 
1939.    We also have the number of veterans reported by state in the Census in 1930 
from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Sample (IPUMS).  The correlations across 
states between these measures and the 1933 veterans’ bureau spending were .952 for the  
IPUMS distribution for 1930, .943 for the distribution of pension amounts in 1932 and 
.945 for the distribution of pension amounts in 1931.   
 In the measure we used in the analysis we used the shares of the national totals 
from the IPUMS data in 1930 and the shares for the VA spending in 1933 and developed 
estimates of the shares in 1932, 1931, 1929, and 1928 using straight-line interpolations.   
We then multiplied the national totals after subtracting out spending that is covered in 
other categories (spending on state and territorial homes, vocational training, government 
life insurance, seamen’s insurance, allotments and allowances, loans to vets for 
transportation, medical and hospital services, and miscellaneous factors).   The national 
totals were $546,255,828 in 1932, $695,951676 in 1931, $626,485,964 in 1930, 
$620,504,069 in 1929, and $611,396,308 in 1928 (calculated from Veterans 
Administrator, 1934, p. 76, Table 40)  We made the adjustments to the national totals 
after comparing totals for 1934 with the OGR reports.  
The U.S. Employment Service grants reported by the OGR were much bigger 
than those reported by the Treasury.  For example, the OGR reported a total for the U.S. 
of $24.556 million, while the Treasury reported $4 million.  However, the Treasury 
figures for 1940 look more like the OGR figures.  In fact, they were substantially larger 
than the 1939 OGR figures at a total around $60 million.  They then fall off markedly to 
$3.1 million in 1940.  We looked at the Monthly Labor Review reports on public 
employment agencies and we cannot explain this sudden rise and fall.  Relative to the 
total spending in those years, the fluctuations would be in the neighborhood of 1.5 
percent of total spending in 1939.  No grants were listed prior to fiscal year 1934, but we 
know that the U.S. Employment Service operated in the early 1930s with a few offices 
and a small staff in several states.  Based on the descriptions of the size of the offices and 
their tasks, we do not believe the expenditures were larger than $30,000 in those states 
prior to 1934.   U.S. Department of Labor, "Public Employment Services,"  Monthly 
Labor Review (January 1931):  10-32.  We chose to leave a value of zero for the U.S. 
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  Among major New Deal programs, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration 
OGR and Treasury values matched in 1939 and there were small differences in 1938, and 
1937, and no listings in 1934-1936 in the Treasury Reports.  The Civilian Conservation 
Corps matched perfectly in 1937 and 1938, the treasury reports were 1.18 times the OGR 
reported amount in each state in 1939. 
  The Public Works Administration total for non-federal and for federal grants 
matched up with the total in the Treasury in 1939.  However, comparisons of the 
Treasury information with information from the First and Second Annual Reports of the 
Federal Works Administrator shows that the Treasury only reported the grants for non-
federal projects in 1940 and 1941.  We filled in the grants for federal projects from PWA 
expenditures form Federal Works Agency.  First Annual Report, 1940,  pp. 328-329 and 
the Second Annual Report, 1941, pp. 318-19.   
For the Works Progress Administration, the sum of the Treasury’s National Youth 
Administration and the WPA matched in 1939 and the sums were off a little in 1936, 
1937, and 1938.  The WPA figures from the OGR matched exactly the WPA annual 
reports of federal expenditures from  WPA, Report on the Progress of the Works 
Progress Administration, various years.  In 1940 and 1941 the Treasury expenditures 
were slightly larger than the WPA expenditures reported in the Federal Works Agency,  
Second Annual Report, 1941,  pp. 452-453, and First Annual Report, 1940,  pp. 436-437.      
The Federal Emergency Administration Grants in the OGR and Treasury Reports 
matched in 1935, 1937, 1938, and 1939 and differed slightly in 1936.  The FERA 
expenditures were not listed in the Treasury Reports of 1934, so no comparisons could be 
made between the OGR and Treasury Reports that year.   
  The Social Security Administration Expenditures reported by the OGR matched 
the Treasury Reports and the grants listed for fiscal 1936 and 1937 in the Social Security 
Board’s Second Annual Report of the Social Security Board, 1937,  pp. 99-100.  These 
included grants for old-age assistance (74 percent of total in 1937) , aid to the blind 
(2.8%), aid to dependent children (14.8%), unemployment compensation administration 
(5.5%), as well as Department of Labor grants for maternal and child health services 
(1.8%), services for crippled children (1.2%), and child welfare services (0.6%), and 
Treasury department grants for public health work (4.6%).   The OGR reports had lower 
totals in 1938 and 1939 than those listed in the Treasury reports, while the Treasury 
reports listed in 1938 and 1939 matched exactly the reported amounts in the Social 
Security Board’s Fourth Annual Report of the Social Security Board, 1939, pp. 195-196.  
We therefore used the Treasury and Social Security grant estimates for 1938 and 1939 
instead of the OGR estimates.   
  The Treasury Department figures for the Farm Security Administration were 
similar to the OGR figures for 1938, but were much larger in 1937 and 1939.   It appears 
that the Treasury was including the value of FSA loans in the grant figures.  For 1940 and 
1941 we adjusted the Treasury figures downward based on the ratio of the OGR grant in 
1939 to the Treasury listing in 1939.   
  The Public Building Administration spending is not reported in the Treasury 
Reports until 1940 but is reported in the OGR Reports.  The data for the OGR matches up 
exactly for 1934 with the data reported for the Public Buildings Administration in Federal 
Works Agency, Annual Report, 1940, pp. 264-265, and are similar in most other years.  
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the Federal Works Agency Annual Report, 1940 , pp. 264-265.  There are some 
substantial differences between the Treasury and the Federal Works Agency report in 
1941 (Federal Works Agency, Annual Report, 1941  pp. 247).  
  The sources for Public Works Administration loans in fiscal years 1940 and 1941 
are Federal Works Agency, First Annual Report, 1940.  Washington, D.C.:  Government 
Printing Office, 1940, pp. 328-329 and  Federal Works Agency, Second Annual Report, 
1941.  Washington, D.C.:  Government Printing Office, 1941, pp. 318-319.   These were 
loans on non-federal projects.  Negative numbers means that bonds were cancelled in lieu 
of payments. 
 
Bureau of Reclamation 
One of the main questions to address is how to deal with the Spending on 
construction of dams and irrigation projects by the Bureau of Reclamation.  Technically, 
all Bureau of Reclamation projects were interest-free loans to the users of the irrigation 
works or the electric works associated with dams.  However, the repayments on the loans 
were generally delayed and in a number of cases the scheduled payments were pushed 
back even further.  This was particularly true during the 1930s.   On some projects the 
loans were forgiven.  Thus, a case could be made that the Bureau of Reclamation 
spending could be treated as similar to grants.  Certainly, in terms of net flow of funds 
they lie somewhere in between the non-repayable grants of the WPA and the loans with 
repayment schedules.  The OGR reports Bureau of Reclamation grant spending.  These 
estimates in most cases are pretty similar to estimates of construction costs reported 
separately in the annual reports of the Bureau of Reclamation after the construction 
spending for the Boulder Dam project (begun in fiscal year 1931), the All-American 
Canal (begun in fiscal year 1935), and the Marshall Ford Dam (Mansfield after 1941 and 
begun in fiscal year 1938) are added to the construction statistics listed in the Bureau of 
Reclamation Annual Reports (see Bureau of Reclamation, Annual Reports for Fiscal 
Year for the period 1921 through 1932) and Secretary of Interior Annual Reports for 
Fiscal Year for the period 1933 through 1941.   
  We constructed two different versions of the Bureau of Reclamation spending.  In 
one we used the OGR estimates of Bureau of Reclamation grant spending for fiscal years 
1934 through 1939 and then added in estimates using the Bureau of Reclamation 
Construction Spending for fiscal years 1930 through 1933 and 1940 and 1941 plus 
construction spending for the Boulder Canyon Project, the All-American Canal and the 
Marshall Ford Dam.  These were added because it was clear from comparisons during 
1934 through 1939 of the spending by state listed by the OGR and Reclamation Bureau 
that those three projects were included in the OGR estimates but not the Reclamation 
Bureau estimates.  The Reclamation Bureau reported separate accounting for the Boulder 
Canyon projects and the All-American Canal in their reports (Secretary of Interior 1933; 
pp. 40-1; 1934, pp. 50-51; 1935, pp. 80-81; 1936, pp. 84-85; 1937, pp. 28-29; 1938, pp. 
77-79; 1939, pp. 225-227; 1940, pp. 120-122; 1941, pp. 45-47). 
In a second set of estimates we used the Bureau of Reclamation Report estimates 
of spending plus the spending on the Boulder Canyon Project, the All-American Canal 
and the Marshal Ford Dam.   We constructed estimates of Boulder Canyon spending from 
the following material.  For the fiscal years 1934 through 1940 the Reclamation Bureau 
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of fixed capital under construction and also total cumulative disbursements by the fiscal 
agents of the project.  For Boulder Canyon the difference between the two cumulative 
numbers was roughly $8 million out of around $60 million total in 1934 and 1935 and $3 
million thereafter, for percentage differences of 13.6 in 1934, 9.3 in 1935, 5.6 in 1936, 
3.3 in 1937, 2.7 in 1937, 2.3 in 1938, and 1.7 in 1939.  The same figures were provided 
for the All-American Canal from 1935 through 1940.   The differences were 142,000 in 
1935 and less than 850,000 thereafter with percentage differences of 6.3 in 1935, 12.3 in 
1936, 5 in 1937, 2.6 in 1938, 2.3 in 1939 and 3 in 1940 (Secretary of the Interior 1934, 
pp. 54-56; 1935, 84-87; 1936, 88-92; 1937, pp. 30-33; 1938, pp. 80-83; 1939, pp. 228-
231; 1940, pp. 123-126).  For fiscal year 1941 we used the appropriations estimates 
reported in Secretary of Interior 1941, pp. 32-33 for Boulder Canyon and listed on p. 557 
in the U.S. Department of Treasury, Budget of the United States, 1942, printed in 1943 ).   
For the Boulder Canyon Project, the Bureau of Reclamation (1932, p. 88 provided an 
estimate of cumulative construction costs by the end of fiscal year 1932 of $21,745,004.  
And information on expenditures in fiscal year 1931 suggests that roughly $5.5 million 
was spent on constructing railroads, highways, Boulder City, and electric transmission 
lines that year (about $3.1 million on railways, $300,000 on highways, $1.5 million on 
transmission lines, and $600,000 on the initial parts of Boulder City (U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation.  Boulder Canyon Project Final Reports:  Part I:  Introductory.  Bulletin I.  
General History and Project Description.  Washington, D.C.:  Government Printing 
Office, 1948, pp. 84-85).  To get an estimate of cumulative construction costs in 1933, we 
subtracted the line item amount of $19,526,000 for the Boulder Canyon Project in the 
Treasury report on expenditures of (Stat. Abstract, 1935, p. 170) from the 1934 estimate.  
The spending for the All American Canal was allocated to California and the Boulder 
Canyon project was split evenly between Arizona and Nevada because it sits astride their 
border.  The split seems to be the way the OGR also allocated the Boulder Canyon funds. 
For the Marshall Ford Dam for the years 1935 through 1939, we used the 
estimates for the Bureau of Reclamation provided by the Office of Government Reports 
for Texas.  The Bureau of Reclamation reported no construction estimates for Texas 
during the period and we had no separate information on the Marshall Ford dam prior to 
1941.  For 1941 we used a figure of $3 million that came from an appropriations request 
by Roosevelt for Marshall Ford Dam in 1941.  For 1940 we assumed a figure of $ 4 
million based on the decline in annual spending between 1939 and 1941.  Marshall Ford 
Dam was allocated to Texas. 
Table A.3 
Estimated Annual Spending on Major Dam Projects for Fiscal Years, 1930-1940 
 
   Estimated Annual Spending for Fiscal Years 
   Boulder Canyon Dam  All American Canal 
Marshall Ford 
Dam 
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1930 0  0 0 0    
1931 5,500,000  5,500,000 0 0    
1932 14,640,028  14,640,028 0 0    
1933 13,682,429  22,106,181 0 0    
1934 19,526,000  19,526,000 0 0    
1935 21,965,333  21,313,868 2,248,138 2,105,904 0
1936 18,896,056  16,719,814 4,332,560 5,287,203 555,731
1937 7,792,162  5,630,729 8,580,700 8,549,162 796,291
1938 6,076,856  5,608,865 7,769,657 7,576,826 5,569,261
1939 5,407,545  5,082,650 3,018,729 3,035,664 5,255,993
1940 4,693,698  4,050,808 1,910,080 2,152,418 4,000,000
1941 6,500,000  6,500,000 1,500,000 1,500,000 3,000,000
   
 
 
Rivers, Harbors, and Flood Control 
  The Office of Government Reports offered estimates of spending on rivers and 
harbors and flood control by the Army Corps of Engineers for the fiscal years 1933 
through 1939.  To push these estimates back to 1928 and forward to 1941 we examined 
the reports of the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, Annual Report of the Chief of 
Engineers for the years 1919 through 1941.  The reports listed the net expenditures by 
project from the Chief of Engineers budgets as well as separate estimates of net spending 
from budgets provided under the National Industrial Recovery Act through the Public 
Works Administration and from budgets provided by the Federal Emergency Relief Acts.  
We found that a number of the state expenditures did not match up well for 1933; 
therefore, we also created an alternative estimate for the rivers and harbors spending 
based on the annual reports.   Some projects were associated with multiple states, like the 
various sub-districts of the Mississippi River and sub-districts of the Ohio River.  In the 
cases where we could identify specific locations within the sub-districts we used the 
amounts spent in those locations to divide the spending between states.  In situations 
where specific information was not available we divided the expenditures based on rough 
estimates of the mileage of the rivers measured with maps and rulers.   In most of the 
districts the spending was not divided by project for the following types of spending:  
preliminary examinations and reports, plant allotments, preliminary examinations and 
reports for flood control and plant allotments for flood control.   For the first two we 
distributed the spending on those categories across states based on the spending in the 
district on the projects in the states in that year.  For the third and fourth categories we 
distributed the spending based on the state distribution of flood control projects.   The 
expenditures we use are net expenditures after net receipts from sales are subtracted.  We 
treated negative values as zeroes in this situation on the grounds that when the area had 
negative net expenditures, they were not pulling money out of the area.     
  The Mississippi River Commission covered the Mississippi River from the Head 
of Passes at the end of the river as it flowed into the Gulf of Mexico to northern parts of 
the river.  For 1922 through 1940, the Mississippi River Commission information for 
Rivers and Harbors spending by the Army Corps of Engineers was reported by district 
and for specific spots where money was spent.  We used a variety of maps, Wikipedia, Fishback and Kachanovskaya  77
and other sources on the internet to locate the specific spots reported and assigned the 
expenditures to the states.   These are the numbers that we used in the basic statistics with 
and without negative numbers for the period 1922 through 1930.  All funds contributed 
by local levee districts and governments were excluded.   
 
 
Splitting the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Loans between fiscal 1932 and 
fiscal 1933.   
We used information from Reconstruction Finance Corporation (1932x, pp. 3-4 and   
1933x, pp. 8-9, 14-15).  The RFC did not report the total loans by state for fiscal year 
1932 or for fiscal year 1933 in their monthly and quarterly reports of 1932 and 1933.  
They did report the number of borrowers by state for fiscal year 1932 for each category:  
banks and trust companies, credit unions, building and loan association, insurance 
companies, mortgage-loan companies, joint-stock land banks, livestock credit 
corporations, agricultural credit corporations and railroads (including receivers).  In the 
1933 report they reported the cumulative number of borrowers in the categories above 
plus the additional categories under the expanded range for the RFC after June 1932.  The 
added categories included Federal Land Banks, Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, 
Regional Agricultural Credit Corporations, Self-liquidating projects, Financing of 
Agricultural Commodities and Livestock, Relief and Work Relief, Loans on Preferred 
Stock of Banks, and Purchases of Capital Notes and Debentures of Bonds.  Using this 
information we determined the number of borrowers (B32js) in each category (j)  in each 
state (s)  as of June 30, 1932 (32) and the additional borrowers added in fiscal year 1933 
(B33js).  The two reports also reported the total loans in each category as of June 30, 1932 
and June 30, 1933.  From that information we determined the value of loans of loans in 
each fiscal year for loans.   We calculated the average loan size for each category of loan 
(l32j)  
 
  l32j = L32j/Σs B32js. 
 
Σs is the summation sign over all states s. 
    
To get an estimate of the amount of loans in state s in 1932 (EL32s) we multiplied the 
number of borrowers in the state in each category (B32js) by the national average loan size 
(l32j) and then summed across all categories. 
 
EL32s = Σj l32j* B32js 
 
We followed the same procedure for each state in 1933. 
 
EL33s = Σj l33j* B33js 
 
The proportion of loans in state s from February 2, 1932 to June 30, 1933 that was in 
fiscal year 1932 (P32s)  is then   
 
P32s = EL32s/ (EL32s + EL33s). Fishback and Kachanovskaya  78
 
This was then multiplied by the reported amount of loans from the Office of Government 
Reports to get the 1932 figure.   The RFC reported Loans allotted, the amount disbursed, 
the amount repaid, and the amount outstanding.   The Office of Government Reports 
appears to have used loans outstanding in their reports, so we used that definition here.   
 
 
Agricultural Loans through Federal Land Banks 1917 through 1932, Emergency 
Crop Loans, 1921-1932 and Farm Credit Administration (Federal Land Banks, 
Land Bank Commissioner, Production Credit Associations, and Emergency Crop 
and Feed Loans) from 1933 forward. 
 
Federal Land Bank Mortgage Loans through 1932.  In 1917 12 Federal Land 
Banks were organized and authorized to “extend long-term mortgage credit to farmers on 
security of first mortgages on farm lands.”  The loans could be made for a period from 5 
to 40 years.  The loans almost entirely were made through national farm loan association, 
corporations charted under the 1917 act and organized by farmers on a cooperative basis.  
The membership of the cooperatives was made up exclusively of borrowers from the 
Federal land banks.  The banks were organized on a cooperative bases because nearly all 
of the stock was owned by the borrower-owned national farm loan associations.  Each 
bank was liable for its own bond issues and the bond issues of the 11 other Federal land 
banks.  As of 1930 the Federal Land Banks held about 12 percent of the farm mortgage 
indebtedness in the U.S.  The administration oversight of these banks was taken over by 
the Farm Credit Administration in 1933 (Federal Farm Loan Board.  Annual Report, 
1930, pp. 2, 12).    Interest rates on bank loans were limited to a maximum of 1 percent 
over the interest rate at which the federal land bank sold its most recent issuance of 
bonds.  For example, in 1925 Federal Land Banks were marketing their bonds at 4.5 
percent, which implied a maximum interest rate on the mortgages to farmers of 5.5 
percent.  Some of the larger banks charged on 5.25 percent (1925, p. 5).   
In May 1921 the Federal Land Banks resumed operation after a cessation of 
lending that lasted roughly 15 months, which seemed to occur between the beginning of 
December 1919 and the end of April 1921.  The stoppage was a result of litigation over 
the constitutionality of the Federal Farm Loan Board lending system established in 1917.  
( pp. 2-3, Federal Farm Board.  Fifth Annual Report of the Federal Farm Board, 1921.  
Washington, D.C.:  Government Printing Office, 1922). 
 
 We collected information on the value of loans closed by the federal land banks 
in each year from the Federal Farm Loan Board Annual Reports for the years 1918, pp. 
25-27; 1919, pp. 25-27; 1920, p. 5; 1921, p. 12; 1922, p. 20; 1923, p. 21-22; 1924, p. 21-
22; 1925, pp. 27-28; 1926, p. 32; 1927, p. 71; 1928, p. 122; 1929, pp. 162, 163;  1930, pp. 
121, 124, 1931, p. 124, 1932, p. 106-7.  The reports reported the amounts loaned through 
December 31, of the year of the report back through 1922.  Between 1922 and 1928 only 
the cumulative totals to December 31 were reported, so the annual amounts were based 
on the change in the cumulative totals.  From 1918 through 1921, the cumulative totals 
through November 30 of the year was reported.  In checking the data we discovered some 
discrepancies in 1929 between the value of loans reported for that calendar year and the Fishback and Kachanovskaya  79
value determined by subtracting the 1928 cumulative total from the 1929 cumulative 
total.   Most were less than 5 percent but Georgia and Florida had sizeable discrepancies.  
We used the 1929 calendar year reported values.  (Fdldbk.xls).  In the analysis we 
converted the calendar year data to a fiscal year basis for year t by taking half of the 
calendar amount in year t and half of the calendar year amount in year t-1. 
 
Farm Loan Board (1931, p. 121; 1929, p. 158; 1928, p. 116; ) showed that 
roughly 60 to 66 percent of the amount of federal land bank loans closed in the calendar  
years 1929 and 1931 were closed in the first half of the year.   53 percent in 1930,  
    
Joint Stock Land Bank Loans.  The Annual Reports of the Federal Farm Loan 
Board first reported loans granted by joint-stock land banks in 1923.  The joint-stock land 
bank loans were privately organized corporations chartered by the federal government to 
provide farm loans.  Interest rates on bank loans were limited to a maximum of 1 percent 
over the interest rate at which the federal land bank sold its most recent issuance of 
bonds.  For example, in 1925 joint stock land banks were marketing their bonds at 4.5 to 
5 percent, which implied a maximum interest rate on the mortgages to farmers of 5.5 to 6 
percent  (1925, p. 5).   
“Based on the results of actual experience, the board deems it wise not to charter 
additional joint-stock land banks, except and unless it shall be shown by a careful survey 
that there is a need for the bank and reasonable assurance of a profitable volume of 
business and evidence that the financial responsibility and competency of the personnel 
of the proposed organization will afford satisfactory and efficient operation.  Such a bank 
must function so as to insure conservatism in its lending activities and at the same time 
accumulate legitimate profits to absorb necessary charges for expenses and still afford 
reasonable dividends to stock holders.(1925, p. 8).”  Between 1923 and 1926 the amounts 
of loans granted from time of organization to October 31
st of the year in question were 
reported (1923, p. 29; 1924, pp. 29-30; 1925, p. 40; 1926, p. 45.  From 1928 onward the 
amounts closed from date of organization through December 31
st of the year were 
reported (1928, p. 122; 1929, p. 163; 1930, p. 125; 1931, pp. 125-127; and 1932, pp. 107-
109).  In 1927 only the loans submitted for approval as collateral for bond issues were 
reported (1927, p. 78).  The same values were also reported for 1928 through 1931 (1928, 
p. 141; 1929, p. 182 ; 1930, p.145  ; 1931, p. 146).   To get a figure for the 1927 loans 
closed, we multiplied the cumulative number of loans submitted for approval for 
collateral in 1927 by the ratio in 1928 of the cumulative loans closed to the cumulative 
loans submitted for approval as collateral in that year for each state.   This estimate is 
likely to be a good estimate because in 1928 the ratio of loans closed to loans submitted 
for approval as collateral ranged from .978 in Tennessee to 1.115 in California with an 
average of 1.043 and a standard deviation of 0.047.  The ratios in 1929 for each state 
were close to the same, as the ratio of the ratio in 1928 to the ratio in 1929 was within 
one percent of one in all but two states.    In 1929 the change in cumulative loans was 
negative for Missouri, and we inserted the annual amount reported on p. 162 in the 
volume.  In 1931 the change in the cumulative total of loans was negative for Ohio and 
Pennsylvania.  We inserted the annual amount reported on p. 124 in the 1931 volume 
instead.   In general, we used the change in the cumulative amounts rather than the Fishback and Kachanovskaya  80
reported annual amounts because only the cumulative amounts were reported in the 
earlier years.   
 
Emergency Crop and Feed Loans through 1932.  Congress made funds available 
for emergency crop production and seed loans in several different years between 1921-
1932 under special appropriations.  We also had precise information on the distribution 
across states of the funds in 1922  (Agriculture Yearbook, 1922, p. 51; 1923, p. 120) and 
in 1924 (Yearbook of Agriculture, 1924, p. 91).  We had information on the states that 
received the emergency loans in 1921, 1929, and 1930.  Using the information from the 
total distribution of loans over the period 1921 through 1930 (FCA, 1933, pp. 115-117), 
we could do a reasonable job of figuring out the distribution of loans across states within 
those years (see fca3337.xls and fca3841.xls).   There were loans in 1921 of $1,935,125 
and in 1922 of 1,481,988. An Act of March 3, 1921 allowed for $1,954,929 in seed-grain 
loans to Montana, North Dakota, Idaho, and Washington.  An Act of March 20, 1922 
authorized lending of $1,481,988 seed-grain loans in crop-failure areas for the crop of 
1922.  The loans were for $24,685 in Idaho, $756,213 in Montana, $661,548 in North 
Dakota, $37,812 in South Dakota, and $1,730 in Washington (Agriculture Yearbook, 
1922, p. 51; 1923, p. 120).  USDA financial statements from 1924 report appropriations 
of $1 million for seed and farm loans to farmers in New Mexico (Yearbook of 
Agriculture, 1924, p. 91).  The total loans reported for 1921-1930 to New Mexico in 
FCA, 1933, pp. 115-117 were $433,849, so we believe that was the amount spent in 
1924.   The USDA financial statement in 1926 included $22,560 in seed grain loans 
(Yearbook of Agriculture,1926,  p. 121). At some point between 1921 and 1930 there 
was another distribution of loans in the range of $1.6 million, but we have not found the 
description of that loan distribution.  It likely occurred in 1927.  In 1929 Congress made 
available $6 million for the USDA to make emergency loans to farmers for seed, feed, 
and fertilizer.  About $5.5 million was loaned in Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Alabama, Georgia and Florida for staple crops.  About $200,000 was loaned in 
southern Florida on vegetables.  By June 30, 1930 about $4.6 million had been repaid.  In 
spring 1930 under the first deficiency act of March 26, 1930, loans were made to other 
farmers in Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Alabama, Georgia and Florida and 
crop financing was aided in Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Oklahoma, New Mexico, 
Minnesota, North Dakota and Montana.  Except in the Southeastern states and in North 
Dakota and Montana, however, the amounts loaned were negligible.  The total spring 
loans amounted to $4,612,136.  In August and September roughly $500,000 was loaned 
in Florida on winter vegetables and another $170,000 was loaned on fall pasture crops in 
Alabama, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Virginia (Yearbook of Agriculture, 1931, pp. 5, 6).    
We had precise information on the distribution of the emergency crop and feed 
loans made during the calendar year for 1931 and 1932 from the annual reports of the 
Federal Credit Administration (First, 1933, pp. 115-117).  The 1932 loans were made 
from funds provided by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation but were administered 
by the Federal Farm Bureau of Loans and were reported there and not in the RFC reports.  
Roughly $120 million was advanced in 1931 and 1932.   Although reported on a calendar 
year basis, nearly all of the loans, with the exception of late loans were made prior to July 
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similar.  Where they were not, we subtracted the loan values in fall year t from the year t  
calendar value and added it to the year t+1 value.        
 
Farm Credit Administration from 1933 onward.  The Farm Credit Administration 
was created in 1933 and the duties of various farm loan activities were merged into its 
administrative realm. The FCA continued the Federal Land Banks.  A new program 
under the Land Bank Commissioner was authorized under the Emergency Farm 
Mortgage Act of 1933 with a fund of $200 million.  The funds were used to refinance 
indebtedness, for providing working capital for farm operations, and for enabling farmers 
to redeem or repurchase property which has been foreclosed since July 1, 1931.  The 
loans were granted on security of first or second mortgages on land and permanent 
improvements.  The maximum amount of loans per farmer was to be $5,000 with no 
indebtedness to exceed 75 percent of the appraised normal value of the property.   These 
loans were focused on farmers who could not obtain Federal land bank financing (  Farm 
Credit Administration,  First Annual Report, 1933, p. 10).    
 
FCA Federal Land Bank and Land Bank Commissioner Loans.  Federal Land 
Bank and Land Bank Commissioner Loans made during the calendar year were reported 
in the Farm Credit Administration Reports (First, 1933, pp. 78-79; Second, 1934, pp. 91-
92;  Third, 1935, pp. 119-120; Fourth, 1936, pp. 115-116; Fifth, 1937, pp. 113-114; 
Sixth, 1938, pp. 187-9; Seventh, 1939, pp. 138-139;  Eighth, 1940, pp.  155-156; Ninth, 
1941, pp.  145-146).  The FCA annual report provided information on the number of 
loans closed by the Federal Land Banks and Land Bank Commissioner during the 11 
months through November 1933.  However, 59.5 percent of the loans closed in the full 
calendar year of 1933 were closed in December of 1933( Farm Credit Administration 
First Annual Report, 1933, p. 7).  Therefore, we multiplied each figure by 1.6809 to 
determine the total loans for the calendar year.  Thus, we are assuming that the 
percentage of loans in each state was the same in December as it had been in the first 11 
months of the year.    
FCA Production Credit Division.  The crop production loans made during the 
calendar year were reported in the Farm Credit Administration Reports, (First, 1933, pp. 
118-119; Second, 1934, pp. 152-154;  Third, 1935, pp. 133-134; Fourth, 1936, pp. 136-
137; Fifth, 1937, pp. 136-137; Sixth, 1938, pp. 187-9; Seventh, 1939, pp. 165-166;  
Eighth, 1940, pp.  201-202; Ninth, 1941, 189-191).  The Farm Credit Act of 1933 also 
created the Production Credit Division, a system of cooperative credit institutions 
chartered by the Farm Credit Administration and operating under rules set up by 12 
Production Credit Corporations (PCC), one in each Federal land bank city.  The local 
associations made loans directly and were capitalized partly by the production credit 
corporations and partly by the borrowers.  They could borrow and rediscount with the 
Federal intermediate credit banks.   The PCCs provided part of the capital for the loans 
and set the regulations.  Their initial capital stock of $7.5 million each was subscribed by 
the Governor of the FCA, and the Governor could raise and lower the capital stock.  The 
funds of the PCCs were not loaned directly to farmers but provided paid-in capital for the 
creation of the PCCs.  Production Credit Associations (PCAs) could be organized by 10 
or more farmer-borrowers after a meeting of interested farmers living in the territory to 
be served.  As of December 31, 1933 there were 322 PCAs, each with a specified Fishback and Kachanovskaya  82
territory.  Class A stock in the PCAs was nonvoting but preferred upon liquidation and 
was purchased primarily by PCCs but could be bought by private investors.  The Farm 
Credit Act called for the value of Class A stock to be roughly 20 percent of the volume of 
loans.  Class B stock was purchased primarily by farmer-borrowers and was paid in as 
loans were made.  Each borrower was required through the local PCA to own class B 
stock equal to 5 percent of the value of his loan.  Each Class B stock holder had one vote.  
The PCAs could rediscount loans in an amount equal to about 5 times their paid-in 
capital.   When the rediscounts were equal to 5 times paid-in capital, the PCCs could 
provide added capital by purchasing more Class A stock.  The plan was to have one-
fourth of the capital stock be owned by borrowers as Class B stock, and the rest as class 
A stock owned by the PCCS (FCA, First Annual Report, 1933, pub. 1934, pp. 33-36).  In 
1933 the state distribution for loans by the PCAs was reported only through November 
31
st of the year.  However, the total for the entire period from January 1 through Dec. 31 
was very close to the amount reported through November 1933 (see FCA, First Annual 
Report, p. 2 and pp. 119-120).  Therefore, we used the total through November for each 
state. 
 
FCA Emergency Crop and Feed Loans.  The administration of the original 
emergency crop and feed loans made by Congressional appropriation was transferred to 
the FCA. In 1933 $90 million was authorized for loans to purchase feed, finance crop 
production, and cover the costs of administering the loans.  Security on the loans was a 
first lien on the crop to be harvested and/or livestock fed.  The 1933 maximum for each 
feed loan was $250, the individual maximum for crop production purposes was $300 and 
the maximum that could be advanced to all tenants of any one landlord was $2,000 ( 
FCA, First Annual Report, 1933, pub. 1934, pp. 51-52).    We had precise information on 
the distribution of the emergency crop and feed loans made during the calendar year for 
each year from 1931 through 1941 from the annual reports of the Federal Credit 
Administration (First, 1933, pp. 115-117; Second, 1934, pp. 168-170;  Third, 1935, pp. 
155-157; Fourth, 1936, pp. 165-167; Fifth, 1937, pp. 174-6; Sixth, 1938, pp. 187-9; 
Seventh, 1939, pp. 205-207;  Eighth, 1940, pp.  232-234; Ninth, 1941, 221-223).   
   
FCA Drought Relief Loans.  In 1934 and 1935 the Farm Credit Administration 
passed out Drought Relief Loans authorized by a Congressional Act approved June 19l, 
1934.  Congress appropriated $525 million for relief in agricultural areas seriously 
affected by drought.  Of that amount the FCA was allocated $96,785,000 to make loans 
to farmers of purchase of seed and feed, summer fallowing, and similar purposes.  The 
Emergency Crop and Feed Loan Section administered the loans.  The first loans were 
disbursed on July 3, 1934 and were made continuously until June 30, 1935 when the 
appropriation expired.  The loans were made principally to care for cattle and other 
livestock in the drought areas.   They were made on “extremely liberal” terms, based on a 
borrower’s unsecured not and on a nondisturbance agreement to expire at the end of 
1935, executed by all holders of liens and other livestock to be fed.  The borrower could 
not increase the lien without permission of the FCA Governor.  Most were made at 5.5 
percent interst.  Loans were also made for orchard rehabilitation in Washington, citrus 
rehabilitation and truck loans related to a freeze in Florida, and strawberry loans.  (FCA 
Third Annual Report, 1935, pp. 75-76). The drought relief loans made during the fiscal Fishback and Kachanovskaya  83
year 1934-1935 are reported in (FCA Third Annual Report, 1935, pp. 158).  We can 
separate them into calendar year loans using information on the loans made during the 
fiscal year 1934 in FCA, Second Annual Report, 1934, p. 168).   
 
The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) loans from the Office of Government Reports 
do not match up well at all with CCC loan information reported for 1939, 1940, and 
1941.  One problem in the OGR reports is there is missing information for 1934.  On 
many state sheets they say that the state by state loans are not available, but then the OGR 
reports  CCC loans for Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, and South Dakota.  In the 1939 state by state report from Department of 
Agriculture (Agriculture Statistics, 1940, p. 632), the cumulative numbers for 1933 
through 1939 don’t match the cumulative numbers from the OGR, in part because of the 
missing 1934 data in many states.  However, the numbers are substantially different for 
the states where the OGR did report the 1934 numbers.  Also in the Agricultural statistics 
for 1939, they state that approximately $159 million in loans were not included because 
they went to cooperative associations.  The CCC numbers are so problematic that we 
removed them from the analysis.     
 
Moat Areas for Instrument Using Spending Outside Region  
 
When constructing one of the instrumental variables, we used a measure of 
federal grant spending in the area outside an geographic “moat” around the state of 
interest.  The moat includes the state’s census region (of 9) and nearby census regions to 
avoid spatial correlation with the error term from potential spillovers.  For New England, 
for example, the moat includes any states in New England, the Mid-Atlantic, the East 
North Central, or the states of Virginia, Maryland, Kentucky, or West Virginia; therefore, 
the component of federal spending for the instrument for that state is based on federal 
spending outside that moat.For the Mid-Atlantic states the area used for the instrument 
does not include any states from New England, the Mid-Atlantic, the East North Central, 
the South Atlantic, or the states of Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.  The area used for the 
instrument for the East North Central states does not include any states from the Mid-
Atlantic, the East North Central, the West North Central, or the states of Alabama, 
Arkansas, Kentucky,  Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, or West Virginia.     The area used for the instrument for the 
West North Central states does not include any states from the East North Central, the 
West North Central, the East South Central, the West South Central, and the Mountain 
States.   The area used for the instrument for the South Atlantic states does not include 
any states from the Mid-Atlantic, the South Atlantic, the East North Central, the East 
South Central, or the West South Central.  The area used for the instrument for the East 
South Central does not include any states from the Mid-Atlantic, the South Atlantic, the 
East North Central, the East South Central, the West South Central, or the states of Iowa, 
Kansas, Missouri, or Nebraska.    The area used for the instrument for the West South 
Central states does not include any states from the East North Central, the West North 
Central, the East South Central, the West South Central, or Mountain regions. The area 
used for the instrument for the Mountain states does not include any states from the West Fishback and Kachanovskaya  84
North Central, the West South Central, the Mountain, or the Pacific regions.  The area 
used for the instrument for the Pacific states does not include any states from the 
Mountain and Pacific regions or the states of Oklahoma, Texas, Kansas, North and South 
Dakota, and Nebraska. 
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